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Purpose: The aim of this research is to explore the motives behind and the methods 
used by the accounting profession to lobby the legislative process of the new EU 
audit reform.  
 
Methodology: The thesis follows a qualitative research strategy. Primary data was 
collected from documents issued by accounting profession and four interviews with 
members of the profession and one EU politician.  To analyze the content and 
context of the data collected Qualitative Content Analysis has been used.  
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Theoretical Perspectives: This thesis uses the Neo-Weberian approach of the 
Theory of Profession in order to identify the motives behind and methods used by 
the accounting profession to lobby the EU institutions.  
 
Empirical Foundation: The empirical research of the thesis was built upon the 
primary data collected from 46 various documents issued by accounting profession, 
for instance, International Federation of Accountants (IFAC), Federation of 
European Accountants (FEE), FAR (Sweden), The European Group of 
International Accounting Networks and Associations (EGIAN), 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), KPMG, Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu (Deloitte), 
Ernst & Young (E&Y) (Big Four); and mid-tier firms, such as, Grant Thornton and 
BDO.  
 
Conclusions: It has been found that amongst the EU institutions, the European 
Commission and the European Parliament came under stronger lobbying by the 
accounting profession compared to the Council of Ministers. The commissioners 
and parliamentarians are easy to access by the lobbyists then the ministers of the 
Member States in the Council. The motives of the accounting profession, especially 
accounting firms, behind the lobbying were found to be the self–interest by 
protecting and maintaining of their  jurisdictions; protecting of its oligopolistic 
status; sustaining  its fee level; controlling the market for its expertise;  maintaining 
of self-regulation and commercial interest.  The methods used by accounting 
profession were submission of comment letters; mobilizing of different agencies; 
exercise of collective power through professional associations, stakeholder 
engagements; propagation of ideology from one institution to another institution; 
usage of knowledge monopoly and aggressive lobbying through threatening the EU 
politicians.    
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Introduction 
This chapter introduces the topic studied in this thesis The Lobbying done by 
accounting profession in the policy-making process: the case of the new EU audit 
reform. The background in Section 1.1 explains why this topic has been chosen and 
the reason for the focus on accounting profession. Section 1.2 of problem 
discussion presents the gap found in the literature i.e. the uniqueness of the context 
of the EU in the lobbying by the accounting profession. Thereafter, Section 1.3 
presents the scope of the thesis. Section 1.4 explains the purpose and presents the 
research questions. The last Section deals with the outline of the thesis. 
1.1  Background 
The recent financial crisis of 2007-8 lead to major corporate collapses, for instance, 
Lehman Brothers. The crisis initiated a comprehensive debate about the possible 
reasons of the crisis. Initially, the focus of the blame was credit ratings agencies, 
bankers, and financial regulators (Humphrey, Kausar, Loft & Woods, 2011). 
However, in 2008 Charlie McCreevy, the EU Commissioner for Internal Market 
and Services, pointed out that the discussion on the role of auditor with regards to 
financial crisis is not highlighted (Humphrey et al., 2011). As it was auditors, who 
issued 'clean' audit reports on large financial institutions just before or during the 
crises (EC, 2010b). At the beginning of 2010 the term of office of McCreevy ended 
(Humphrey et al., 2011) and a Frenchman Michel Barnier got nominated as EU 
Commissioner for Internal Market and Services. The change in Commissioners 
leads to a paradigm shift in the regulatory sphere of EU. The Irish Chartered 
Accountant McCreevy was known for his free market view and liberal policies, 
whereas, Barnier was perceived of imposing French inspired restrictive regulation 
across Europe (Humphrey et al., 2011). The perception turned out to be reality, 
when immediately after Barnier resumed the office in April 2010 it was announced 
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EC will publish a Green Paper on the role of auditors. In October 2010 the Audit 
Green Paper entitled ‘Audit Policy: Lessons from the Crisis’, was issued on 13 
October 2010 (EC, 2010c). 
 
With the issuance of the GP and the measures proposed in the paper, it became 
evident that Barnier is not as supportive of the accounting profession as McCreevy. 
The measures included: Mandatory Audit Firm Rotation (MFR) (EC, 2010b, p. 11); 
prohibition of providing non-audit services (NAS) to audit clients and creation of 
‘pure audit’ firms (EC, 2010b, pp. 11–12); restricting the percentage of fee received 
from a single client (ECb, 2010c). The objective of the reform was threefold: 
enhance the quality of audit, increase the independence of the auditors and to 
reduce the market concentration of the large audit firms. The European 
Commission (EC) invited responses to the GP and received diversified responses to 
measures suggested. The responses were received from various stakeholders 
including accounting profession, preparers (companies), academia, audit 
committees, public authorities, users and others (EC, 2011b). Majority of the 
responses received by the EC were from the audit profession (59%) (EC, 2011b) 
(see Figure 1), as it is the primary supplier of audit services and direct recipients of 
audit regulation (Samsonova-Taddei & Humphrey, 2015). Not surprisingly, the 
response of the profession was extremely negative to some of the measures, for 
instance, MFR and Prohibition of NAS (EC, 2011b). The opposition of the 
profession was communicated to the EU institutions through various comment 
letters and other methods, classified under lobbying. Lobbying is defined as a 
process undertaken to influence regulators with the intention of benefiting one's self 
(Burnett, Chen & Gunny 2013). It was figured out that especially the large audit 
firms engaged in fierce lobbying (Fleming, 2013a; Fleming, 2013b). 
 
3 
 
Figure 1 Responses by interest groups (EC, 2011b) 
1.2 Problem discussion 
Relevant studies that discuss lobbying by members of accounting profession 
provide evidence that multinational accounting firms are centrally involved in 
regulation (Cooper & Robson, 2006). They achieve this by extending their 
involvement in the standard setting process, by using their business connections, to 
ensure that the firms have substantial influence, both nationally and internationally 
(Caramanis, 2002). Caramanis (2002) also discussed the interconnections of 
international politics and accounting professionalization projects at the National 
level. Humphrey, et al., (2009) identifies that at international level global auditing 
regulation is collectively influenced by three groups namely, IFAC; International 
Regulators including the World Bank, the International Organization of Securities 
Commissions (IOSCO), the International Association of Insurance Supervisors 
(IAIS); the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) (also often referred 
to as the Basel Committee) and the European Commission (EC); and lastly the 
large multinational audit firms. Prior researchers have also discussed the role and 
influence of actors in the accounting profession on the transnational regulatory 
framework (Cooper & Robson, 2006; Suddaby, Cooper, & Greenwood, 2007). 
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Further, on national level studies in the past mostly discuss the role and influence 
of actors of accounting profession in the accounting standard-setting in the USA 
(Puro, 1984; Abigail, Ramanna, & Roychowdhury, 2014; Burnett et al., 2013). 
Samsonova-Taddi & Humphrey (2015) discuss the European transnational audit 
policy-making, but only in the context of a strong campaign launched by large 
international accounting firms to limit civil liability for statutory auditors. In this 
paper, the discussion revolved around the Recommendation issued by EC in 2008. 
 
Whereas, firstly, it has been found that the literature on lobbying by the accounting 
profession, using the Theory of Profession, is limited. Secondly, it has been found 
that lobbying the legislative process in the EU has generally attracted a lot of 
attention from various researchers; however, enough discussion is not found on the 
lobbying by accounting profession to influence the legislative process of the new 
EU audit reform. One reason for the lack research could be this that the reform is 
very new and is yet to be implemented. Thirdly, most of the literature found on the 
topic of lobbying by the accounting profession either studied the topic on 
international level or the national level, however, literature on regional level, such 
as, the EU is found to be very limited.  Lastly, it has been found that in the past 
lobbying by the accounting profession to influence the accounting standard-setting, 
has been discussed by various researchers, however, lobbying by accounting 
profession on audit standard setting and policy reforms are yet to be explored. 
 
Therefore this thesis will concentrate on the new EU audit legislation to study the 
lobbying done by accounting profession on regional (EU) level. The legislation 
comprises of Directive 2014/56/EU and Regulations 537/2014.  The reform is 
strictly applicable to public-interest entities (PIE) (EU, 2015a) and presents a 
number of amendments to the previous Directive of 2006. The amendments have 
been introduced to improve the quality of the audit and to increase the 
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independence of auditors, in the wake of the financial crisis 2008, which has raised 
significant questions and criticisms on the role and objectivity of auditors (EC, 
2010b). Some of the major amendments to the regulation included capping of fee 
for non-audit services to 70% of the average of the audit fee in the last three years 
(Article 4); Prohibition of the provision of NAS including tax, valuation and legal 
services, unless they are immaterial (Article 5) and mandatory audit firm rotation 
after every 10 years (Article 17) (EC, 2014b). 
 
These measures, introduced in the Regulation, are the focus of this thesis as they 
are the most controversial ones and in the vast majority they have received negative 
responses from the profession (EC, 2011b). The reluctance to adhere to the 
amendments to the Regulation by the profession and their attempts to influence the 
legislative process of the new EU audit reform has attracted significant media 
attention; especially the collective lobbying act of the members of the accounting 
profession is much highlighted (Fleming, 2013a; Fleming, 2013b). The motives 
behind and the methods used to lobby can be explained by the Theory of Profession 
(Abbott, 1988, Friedson, 1970, Larson, 1977 etc). Using the Neo-Weberian 
approach of the Theory of Profession, the focus of the thesis will be to explore the 
motives behind and methods employed by the members of accounting profession to 
lobby the EU institutions, to influence the legislative procedure, i.e. from the 
drafting of the legislation by the EC to its approval by EP and the Council of 
Ministers.  
1.3 Scope of the Thesis 
This thesis will focus on some components of the accounting profession, for 
instance accounting firm of different scale, such as, PwC, KPMG, Deloitte, E&Y 
(Big Four); and mid-tier firms, such as, Grant Thornton and BDO. In addition, this 
study will look at professional organizations, such as, IFAC, FEE, FAR (Sweden), 
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ECG, and EGIAN. The responsibility of the profession is to determine what level 
of audit quality and professional reputation is desired by its members (Byington & 
Sutton, 1991). The attention of thesis is pivoted to the three measures i.e. MFR, 
Prohibition of NAS and Cap on fee of NAS only, as they are the most negatively 
responded measures of the Regulation 537/2014.  
 
As mentioned above, the accounting profession engaged in the act of lobbying, to 
influence the audit regulation. However, the thesis does not aim to establish 
whether the profession succeeded or not. The period chosen for data collection 
range between 2010 and 2014 because the debate started with the issuance of GP in 
13-Oct-2010 and 16-Apr-2014, when the final act got signed. The reform 
comprises of the Regulation 537/2014 and the Directive 2014/56/EU. However, the 
three measures in question are part of the Regulation. Therefore, the thesis 
concentrates on the Regulation and not on the Directive.   
1.4 Purpose and research question 
The aim of this research is to explore the motives behind and the methods used by 
the accounting profession in lobbying the legislative process of the new EU audit 
reform. The focus of this research is three significant changes in the new reform. 
Firstly, MFR, secondly, prohibition of the provision of NAS and thirdly, capping of 
fees of NAS.  As these reforms have mostly received negative responses from the 
members of the accounting profession and are thus, indicative of evidence of 
lobbying on the part of the profession (EC, 2011b). This paper will analyze the 
lobbying on the new EU audit reform by the accounting profession on Regional 
level (FEE); additionally, this thesis will also look at lobbying on International 
(IFAC) and National (FAR, Sweden) levels. The objective of this thesis is to 
contribute to the literature in the field lobbying done by accounting profession, 
using the Theory of Profession, to explain the motives and methods used by the 
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auditors to influence the audit policy making at EU level. To achieve it the thesis 
will investigate how and why did the auditors lobby to influence the new EU audit 
reform? 
1.5 Outline of the thesis 
The second chapter will describe the EU law-making process, the development of 
the EU audit policy making, for instance, the 8th Council Directive of 1984; the 8th 
Directive of 2006; and Directive and Regulation of 2014; and lobbying the EU 
institutions. The third chapter will deal with the methodology for the thesis, which 
will include sampling of responses to the Green Paper 2010 and other ways of 
communication used by members of the accounting profession. Further, interviews 
will be conducted with professional organizations, for instance, IFAC, FEE and 
FAR; and some politicians from the European Parliament (EP). The fourth chapter 
will outline the theoretical framework and literature review.  The fifth chapter will 
present the findings of the research followed by the sixth chapter where the 
findings will be analyzed and discussed. The final chapter will present the summing 
up and implication of this study for future research.  
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2 The EU law-making process and the 
development of audit regulation 
This chapter describes the EU law-making process and background of the 
development of the EU audit reform. Section 2.1 provides the details of the EU 
legislative process. Section 2.2 puts forward the how the audit reforms have been 
developed in the EU since 1978. Lastly, Section 2.3 explains how the different 
thegovernance institutions are lobbied. 
2.1 The EU law-making process  
Since the establishment of EU, under the Rome Treaty the EU has focused on the 
creation of the European Single Market as one of its key policy priorities (EU, 
2015c). In this context, the EU has been engaged in the development of common 
law to create a uniform infrastructure for the functioning of the European capital 
markets. In addition to introduce harmonized rules for financial accounting and 
audit practice (EU, 2015c). This uniform infrastructure of common law comprises 
of both binding and non-binding legal acts. Among the three forms of binding 
legislation are; firstly, Regulation which represent the most direct form of EU law 
as they are binding in their entirety and directly applicable in all EU member states 
(EU, 2015d). Secondly, Directives deliver the policy objectives to be achieved by 
all Member States but leave it to the national authorities the choice of form and 
methods (EU, 2015d). Thirdly, Decisions are the legislative acts that target specific 
issues and are binding in its entirety upon those to whom it is addressed (EU, 
2015d). However, Recommendations and Opinions are examples of non-binding 
legal acts (EU, 2015d). Setting of EU policy agenda and development of new or 
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revised legislation is dealt by the three key legislative bodies, including the 
European Commission (EC), the European Parliament (EP) and the Council of 
Ministers (EU, 2015c).  
 
In the EU, the legislative process for a reform gets initiated by publication of a 
proposal (EU, 2015c). The power to make legislative proposals rest with EC, the 
Commission can propose Directives or legally binding Regulations; the EP and 
Council of Ministers being the co-legislators have the ultimate decision-making 
power, either to adopt or amend the legislation (EU, 2015c). The EU's standard 
decision-making procedure is known as 'Ordinary Legislative Procedure’ (see 
Appendix A), that starts at the EC (EU, 2015c). However, the original idea can be 
initiated by the EU, European Central Bank, European Investment Bank, some 
Member States and even citizen. EC drafts and send the proposal to the Council 
and EP (EU, 2015c). The designated rapporteur is appointed to prepare a draft 
report that represents EPs position on the proposal (EU, 2015c). The responsible 
committee will then discuss and vote on the report and any subsequent 
amendments (EU, 2015c). Then the proposal the sent forward for the plenary 
debate (EU, 2015c). MEPs either adopt the law in its current form or they make 
amendments (EU, 2015c). In the meanwhile, simultaneously the Council prepares 
their position on the proposed law (EU, 2015c). They have two options, either they 
can accept the proposal as it is and it gets adopted into the law, or they make 
amendments and send a new draft back to MEPs, for second reading. MEPs have 
three option for the second reading, firstly, approves the council's new proposal and 
the law is adopted, this happens when the negotiations are completed (EU, 2015c). 
Secondly, they reject the amendments outright, and the act is declared null and 
void, then the procedure will be ended (EU, 2015c). Lastly, Parliament can make 
changes to the Council draft and send back to the council for the second reading 
(EU, 2015c). If the Council agrees to the latest amendments, the proposal is 
adopted as law (EU, 2015c).  
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If the consensus on the proposed amendment is not reached, then the 
representatives of the EP and Council meet to make new text that is acceptable to 
both institutions (EU, 2015c). The EC is also involved in this stage to try and 
reconcile both positions if a compromise cannot be reached the process ends (EU, 
2015c). However, if the Parliament and the Council can agree on the text, then the 
proposition goes for a third reading (EU, 2015c). To be adopted both the Council 
and the EP give the final draft of their approval, if not then the process ends (EU, 
2015c). The whole legislative procedure should start from the beginning if 
consensus cannot be reached (EU, 2015c). 
2.2 Background of development of the EU audit 
regulations 
The statutory audit has been a concern of the EU regulators since 1978 in the 
Article 51, 4th Council Directive 78/660/EEC (EU, 2015a). According to this 
Directive companies’ annual reports must be audited by members authorized by the 
national law, also to verification of consistency annual report and annual accounts 
(EC, 1978). The Directive and its requirements continued to develop with the 
growth of accounting and auditing profession in the EU. In this wake the 7th 
Directive was issued in the year 1983, which expanded on the requirements of the 
4th Directive to incorporate the audit of consolidated accounts and verification of 
its consistency with consolidated annual report, by the authorized auditors (EC, 
1983). Further, in 1998 the EU’s 8th Directive was issued, which completed the 
series of Directives regarding company accounts and defining the required 
qualifications of persons authorized to conduct the statutory audits of the 
accounting documents, as specified in the 4th and 7th Directives (Humphrey & 
Loft, 2011). The 8th Directive did not contain any specific guidance regarding 
independence requirement and the discussion concerning the independence of the 
auditors, was limited (Evans & Nobes, 1998). Collectively, these three Directives 
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served the purpose of promoting harmonization of accounting and auditing across 
the EU (Humphrey et al., 2011). Publishing of companies’ financial information 
together with verification of companies’ accounts by independent and qualified 
auditor resulted in increased transparency, as well as, increased reliability and 
confidence in the information released by companies across the EU (EC, 1996).  
 
However, in 1990 the role, function and independence of statutory auditor came 
under strong scrutiny of the EC, particularly after numerous financial failure and 
corporate scandals (Humphrey et al., 2011). Major corporate scandals, for instance, 
in 2001 Enron, Worldcom and Parmalat prompted the need in the USA and Europe 
to undertake detailed examination of its financial reporting, statutory audit and 
corporate governance regulations (Dewing & Russell, 2004; EC, 2003). In addition, 
these financial failures and scandals raised criticisms towards the attitude and 
actions of the auditors, that indicated deteriorating auditor independence 
(Humphrey et al., 2011) and the lack of harmonized approach to statutory auditing 
in the EU (EC, 2003). At that point, the EU regulatory framework for statutory 
auditors was considered "incomplete" to deal with this rising issue (EC, 1996). In 
this context, in 1996 the EC published a Green Paper for consultation on "The 
Role, Position and Liability of the statutory auditors within the European Union" 
(Humphrey et al., 2011). As a result of the consultation process the lacking in the 
regulation governing statutory auditors at EU level and the need for further 
regulations in the area of auditor independence became highlighted (Humphrey et 
al., 2011). The auditor independence became questionable as a result of a variety of 
consultancy services provided by the audits firms to their audit clients and long 
term association of the firm's with clients (Humphrey et al., 2011). Furthermore, 
the Green Paper 1996 pointed to the importance of the creation of an audit 
committee and proper functioning system of internal control in order to “improve 
the system of checks and balances within the company” (EC, 1996, p.25). These 
issues ultimately lead to the issuance of a new EU Directive in 2006. The overall 
objective of this Directive was to improve and harmonize the quality of the 
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statutory audits by focusing on external quality assurance, auditing standards and 
auditor independence and to restore public confidence in the function of statutory 
audit and the accounting profession (EC, 2003). The new Directive proposed the 
adoption of International Standards on Auditing (ISA) as EU standard for audit and 
rotation of audit partner within the same audit firm, as a measure to improve quality 
audit and independence of auditors (EC, 2006). 
 
Moreover, in the backdrop of the relatively recent financial crisis of 2008 the new 
regulatory framework for statutory audit was introduced. One of the major reasons 
for the new crisis was discussed in the Green Paper 2010 as the limited attention 
given to enhancement of the audit function that can lead to increase in the financial 
stability. It was after McCreevy, the EU Commissioner of Internal Market and 
Services, in 2008 pointed out that the discussion on the role of auditor with regards 
to financial crisis is not highlighted, by 2010 the criticism on the role of auditors 
substantially increased (Humphrey et al., 2011). The criticism on the role and 
independence of auditors increased as a result of inability of auditors to scrutinize 
the intrinsic financial weaknesses of the large financial institutions and issuance 
of 'clean' audit reports for those institutions just before the crises (EC, 2010b). The 
aim of the new EU legislation on statutory audit including Directive 2014/56/EU 
and Regulation 537/2014 is to improve the quality of statutory audit, increasing the 
independence of auditors, improving audit supervision and enhance the 
informativeness of the audit report (EU, 2015a). The regulation is more strictly 
applicable on public-interest entities (PIE) (EU, 2015a). Some of the major 
amendments to the Regulation included capping of fee for non-audit services to 
70% of the average of the audit fee in the last three years (Article 4); Prohibition of 
the provision of NAS including tax, valuation and legal services, unless they are 
immaterial (Article 5) and mandatory audit firm rotation after every 10 years 
(Article 17) (EC, 2014b). This new regulatory framework for statutory audit will 
become applicable in 2016 (EU, 2015a).  
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2.3 Lobbying the EU Institutions 
Lobbying is defined as any activity, which is aimed to influence legislation process 
in the European institutions (EC, 2006). However, in several EU Member States 
lobbying as a word is related to negatively perceived. Recently the terminology of 
lobbying is replaced by words like 'legal representation' (EP, 2003) and 'interest 
representation' (EC, 2006). In the EU, the “decision-making triangle” (the EC, the 
EP and the Council of Ministers) is subjected to most of the lobbying activities. 
Firstly, the EC is considered to face the majority of the lobbying activities, as it is 
responsible for agenda setting and has an initiative power to make a proposal for 
the legislation (EP, 2003). In addition, it manages the implementation of the policy 
in EU. Therefore, the Commission is ‘a crucial target for private interests' (Coen & 
Richardson, 2009, p. 33). Moreover, as it is convenient to access the 
Commissioner, due to their lower ranks and need of expert knowledge for the 
Commission's legislative work, the lobbyist finds it easy to target the Commission 
through its Commissioner. The Commission relies on the lobbyists for valuable 
information, as it can only forward well-prepared proposal to other institutions 
(Marziali, 2006). Therefore, it appears a balanced give and take lobbying activities 
(OECD, 2008).  
 
Previously the EP was not the focus of lobbying activities, as it did not that enough 
legislative power. However, a significant change occurred in the role of the 
Parliament by the Single European Act (SEA) in 1986 (Coen & Richardson, 2009). 
It introduced the co-decision and consultation procedure, after which the legislative 
power of the Parliament grew to the same level as the Council. Thereafter, the 
attention of lobbyists got diverted to the growing competence and power of the 
Parliament (Coen & Richardson, 2009). Even though the Parliament does not have 
the authority to initiate proposals on its own, it cannot be assumed that it cannot be 
lobbied. Rather it holds a unique position for strategic lobbying because every 
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MEPs can be a subject of lobbying and the Parliament itself contributes to the 
legislation process by proposing amendments (Coen & Richardson, 2009). 
 
The Council provides the EU with the necessary impetus for its development and 
defines the general political guidelines (Peterson & Shackleton, 2006). It is argued 
that lobbying in the Council rarely takes place as it is difficult for the lobbyist to 
access the ministers and the high-level setup fragmentation (Peterson & 
Shackleton, 2006). The Council meets in nine different compositions and the state 
authorities visit Brussels only for a limited period. Because of the tense schedules 
of the council members they have no time for additional meetings with 
lobbyists (Peterson & Shackleton, 2006). Therefore, lobbying activities directed to 
the Council differs in a manner from that of the EC and the EP. However, the fact 
that Council also becomes a target for the lobbying cannot be denied. 
 
The matters on which decision are taken and policies are made by EU affects its 
citizens, businesses and the industry or the sector concern. Therefore, it needs to be 
as transparent as possible. Since, EU decision and policies affect various 
stakeholders it is necessary for EU institutions interact with the groups and 
organizations that represent the specific interest of these stakeholders. The EU 
takes into consideration the interest of its stakeholders in its decision-making 
process, as it is legitimate and to ensure that EU policies reflect and are effective in 
catering to the real needs of its stakeholders. To ensure transparency and to allow 
for proper scrutiny the EP and the EC are committed to being open about the 
groups and organizations with which they interact. To facilitate this process the EP 
and the EC operate a joint system of the Transparency Register, which has been set 
up to answer question and queries, such as, what interests are being pursued, by 
whom and with what budgets (Europa, 2015a). Moreover, the register also 
discloses the names of the individual who had access to the EP premises, on behalf 
of the entities whose interest they are representing. 
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3  Research design and methodology  
In this chapter Section 3.1 presents the choice of research approach. Section 3.2 
illustrates how the research will be conducted, followed by, Section 3.3 presents the 
details about the collection of data and its sources i.e. official documents sent by 
the profession to EU and the interviews. Section 3.4 illustrates how the research 
approach chosen will be used to analyze the information extracted from the data 
collected. Section 3.5 explains and illustrates the process of coding undertaken. 
Section 3.6 presents the ethical considerations followed during of the research and 
the last Section presents the limitations of the research methodology. 
 
3.1 Research strategy 
This thesis will adopt a qualitative interpretive research strategy, as it relies on the 
linguistic of the text rather than the numerical data, and uses meaning-based rather 
than quantitative forms of data analysis (Bryman & Bell, 2007). This approach 
allows the researcher to understand the context of the reaction of the actors relevant 
to the study (Bryman & Bell, 2007). Moreover, the focus is on individuals 
interpretative skills, based on the context of the information gathered (Bryman & 
Bell, 2003). Qualitative interpretive research approach will be followed, as it 
allows for development of deeper understanding of the motives behind and 
methods used by the profession to lobby, rather than merely focusing on probability 
of these words occurring in the text. However, the research needs to be supported 
by the theory, in order to justify its relevance.  
 
16 
 
The authors have chosen the Theory of Profession to understand the arguments 
presented by various members of the accounting profession in the documents 
published by them. In addition the theory will help to draw and explain the motives 
behind and methods used by the accounting profession to influence the EU 
institutions during the legislative process of the audit reform.  
 
The analysis of the content using this approach will begin with comment letters and 
all the publicly available communication held between the members of the 
accounting profession and the EU regulators. Further, four qualitative interviews 
will be conducted, to strengthen the arguments for and against the data collected 
and to develop in-depth understanding of the official documents released publicly. 
Afterwards, through the coding process pattern of responses will be developed. At 
the stage of analyses, the theory will help in explaining the findings and the 
findings that are not explained by the theory will formulate the contribution of this 
research to the Theory of Profession.  
3.2 Research Design 
The goal of this thesis is to identify the motives and methods used by members of 
the accounting profession to influence the policy making-process of the new EU 
audit reform. In this context, the research will be divided into two parts. Firstly, to 
capture the attitude and reaction of the accounting profession analysis of the 
documents will be conducted, that will include responses to the Green Paper 2010, 
comment letters and various other forms of communication taking place between 
members of the profession and the EU between October 2010 and April 2014. The 
analysis and incorporation of the comment letters and other supporting documents 
will highlight the motives and present the methods of lobbying by the accounting 
profession. 
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According to Königsgruber (2009) comment letters as a tool for lobbying, is most 
often used by prior research as their empirical evidence (Allen et al., 2014; 
Samsonova-Taddei & Humphrey, 2015; Manson & Zaman, 1999). Moreover, 
Georgiou (2004) found the correlation between the usages of comment letters with 
the usages of other means of lobbying. This justifies the use of comment letters as a 
proxy for professions overall lobbying position (Königsgruber, 2009). However, 
the usage of comment letters and official documents do not account for informal or 
‘‘behind the scenes’’ lobbying, which might include monetary contributions to 
politicians and standard-setters (Königsgruber, 2009). In this context, the evidence 
of informal lobbying is found in the case of funding provided by large audit firms 
to IFAC, the global audit standard setter (Humphrey & Loft, 2011). Therefore, 
second step of this thesis is to conduct semi-structured interviews with members of 
the profession who were involved in influencing the EU audit policy making and 
European politicians, who directly observed the legislative process in the EP.  
 
The reaction and the lobbying done by the accounting firms through professional 
organizations including IFAC, FEE, FAR, ECG, EGIAN will be analyzed. IFAC is 
the global organization for the accounting profession (IFAC, 2015a). FEE 
represents the accounting profession in the Europe and it is also a member of IFAC 
(FEE, 2015a). FAR (Sweden) represents accountancy profession at local level. In 
addition, FAR also contributes actively to the work of IFAC and FEE (FAR, 
2015a). Furthermore, ECG represents the ﬁrms in their dealings with European 
governance institutions, particularly the EC and the EP (Samsonova-Taddei & 
Humphrey, 2015). EGIAN, “provides a forum for the members to develop common 
positions on specific technical and legislative issues and to debate these issues with 
key professional stakeholders and regulators such as the EU” (EGIAN, 2015, 
online). In addition, large multinational accounting firms including 'Big Four' plus 
two leading mid-tier firms (Grant Thornton and BDO), as they dominate the global 
market for the audit for the listed companies (Samsonova-Taddei & Humphrey, 
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2015). Moreover, the interviews with the professional bodies such as IFAC, FEE, 
FAR and European politicians will be conducted.  
3.3 Data Collection 
Collection of data for research purpose is often divided into two categories 
depending how it is collected. If the research is based on the use of material that 
originated in the course of another research, or collected by someone else is 
referred to as secondary data. This data collection technique contrast with the 
primary data collection, where the information is self-gathered (Arbnor & Bjerke, 
1994). This thesis is mainly constructed from information collected from primary 
sources, to answer the research question. The data gathering consist of a collection 
of comment letters, various other ways of communication between profession and 
EU institutions and interviews with members of the accounting profession and EU 
politicians. 
3.3.1 Text Documents  
To begin with the responses of accounting profession to the Green Paper 2010 will 
be collected. Other methods of communication, such as, news release and letters to 
the EC etc from 2010 to 2014 will be analyzed, as the debate started with the 
issuance of GP in 13-Oct-2010 and 16-Apr-2014, when the final act got signed. 
Firstly, the comment letters written in response to the Green Paper 2010 by Big 
Four and two leading mid-tier firms Grant Thornton and BDO; professional 
organizations and EGIAN are gathered from the database “Consultation on audit 
policy - Lessons from the Crisis available” available on the EC web-library (EC, 
2010c). Secondly, other modes of communication include information from IFAC 
published on its website (IFAC, 2015b). Further, FEE's summary on reform of 
audit market will be analyzed, which includes news release, letters to the EC, 
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articles in professional journals, policy statements, speeches in the EP and briefing 
papers (FEE, 2015 b). Moreover, FAR's debate articles on their website, 
professional magazines and financial newspaper, such as, Balans and Dagens 
Industri respectively; FAR position paper on EU audit reform will be incorporated; 
and EGIAN’s position papers were found on its website  (EGIAN, 2015). To 
further analyze the individual reactions of the direct recipients of the audit reform 
i.e. the Big Four audit firms and the two mid-tier firms BDO and Grant Thornton, 
this thesis will focus their press release and published viewpoints from the websites 
(see Appendix B). The documents incorporated in the analysis were selected using 
two criteria that were some specific words related to the topic were used, for 
instance, “the EU audit reform”, “EU audit regulation”, “Directive and Regulation 
2014”, “Audit reform” between the selected period of 2010-2014. Secondly, the 
relevant documents were looked for the three measures: MFR; prohibition of NAS 
and Capping of fees. Moreover, to find the details of lobbying by the relevant 
members of the accounting profession the Transparency Register will be used. (see 
Table 1). 
 
Member of profession Number of documents studied 
IFAC 3 
FEE 9 
FAR 7 
PWC 10 
Deloitte 3 
Ernst & Young 6 
KPMG 2 
BDO 2 
Grant Thornton  1 
EGIAN 3 
Total 46 
 
Table 1 Documents studied  
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3.3.2 Semi-structured interviews  
The next step is to interview the members of the accounting profession, such as 
IFAC, FEE and FAR and one European politician will be conducted. The 
motivation and the purpose of interviewing member of the profession are to 
develop in-depth understanding of underlying motives and methods used in order to 
influence the policymaking process. In addition, the interview with European 
politician is conducted in order to investigate the different methods and intensity of 
lobbying that they have witnessed, by being present in the EP. The motivation 
behind using interviews in combination with document analysis is to compare the 
responses of the interview participants with information published in the 
documents mentioned above, to verify it or it can also lead to new discoveries of 
responses to the reform if found contradictory with the content published (see 
Appendix C and D). 
 
The choice of the semi-structured interview was made, as it allows the interviewer 
explore in the topic in diverse directions, to enrich the analysis (Bogner, Littig & 
Menz, 2009). Moreover, during the document study the choice of interviewees 
were made, based on their media interaction and remarks, involvement in 
presenting the view of their organization on the reform and their publications in the 
professional journals.  
 
Initially the choice of the interviewees was Mr. Dan Brännström for FAR, as he 
published some critical articles regarding the EU audit reform in Swedish 
professional journals. For FEE, it was Mr. Olivier Boutellis-Taft, as he was actively 
involved in the communication and meetings to represent FEEs critical views 
regarding the reform. For IFAC, Mr. Gary Pflugrath was chosen, as he presented 
IFACs official opinion regarding the reform. Cecilia Wikström (MEP) was selected 
as she was present in the EP when the new EU audit reform was voted. 
Additionally, she witnessed and commented on aggressive lobbying done by Big 
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Four globally during 2010-2014 (Lennartsson, 2014). Finally, Syed Kamall (MEP) 
was chosen as he was active in the legislative procedure of the reform. However, 
except Gary Pflugrath, the authors could not conduct interviews with the selected 
people, due to different reasons. Instead close colleagues who had relevant 
knowledge of the reform were recommended by the interviewees mention above 
(see Table 2).   
 
 
Interviewee Organization Position Date of the 
interview 
Duration of the 
interview 
Noémi Robert FEE Manager 
Integrity & Assurance 
(since 2012) 
24.04.2015 45 min 
Harry Cooper European 
politician 
Former accredited 
parliamentary assistant to 
Syed Kamall (MEP) ( 
2010-2014) 
05.05.2015 46 min 
Gary Pflugrath 
 
IFAC Director, Public Policy & 
Regulation 
11.05.2015 30 min 
Helene Agélii FAR General counsel at FAR 12.05.2015 35 min 
 
Table 2 Interview details  
3.4 Analysis of information 
In order to analyze and evaluate the above-mentioned documents and the 
information obtained from the interviews; this thesis will adopt the method of 
Qualitative Content Analysis (QCA). It is one of the numerous research methods 
that are used to analyze text data (McTavish & Pirro, 1990; Tesch, 1990). The 
research using QCA focuses on the characteristics of language as communication 
with attention to the content and contextual meaning of the text (Hsieh & Shannon, 
2005). QCA is used for text data which might be in verbal, print, or electronic form 
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and might have been obtained from narrative responses, interviews, observations, 
or print media such as articles and book (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005). The choice of 
this particular method is made on the basis that it is relevant to the analysis of the 
data gathered for this thesis. It directly deals with the written and verbal responses 
and communication between the accounting profession and the EU institutions. 
Additionally, it also incorporates answers of European politician. Moreover, QCA 
goes beyond merely counting relevant words or taking information as it is, to 
examine the language used. It allows for understanding of the content of the text as 
well as the context in which the text is produced. This facilitates the process of 
classifying the vast amount of text and data into categories, to ease the process of 
coding, drawing of pattern from the data, interpretation and to check whether the 
Theory of Profession explains the findings or not. 
 
The use of QCA will allow gaining direct information from research data and the 
unique perspectives of the European politician, based on their experiences and 
observations of the attitude and activities of the accounting profession, during the 
legislative procedure of the audit reform. Collection of first-hand data will add to 
the originality of the study, as well as, might make it relevant for future research. 
Further, conducting interviews with people concern will verify and add reliability 
to the data collected for the thesis. 
 
To find the link between the empirical data collected, that are the arguments and 
methods of lobbying used by the profession, and the theory used to explain these 
findings, the authors begin by codifying both the verbal and the text data. In the 
next stage, the closely related arguments and methods were merged and classified 
under the same heading. Employing the qualitative interpretive research strategy 
and QCA enabled the authors to perform an in-depth analysis of the arguments 
presented by the members of the profession and the methods of lobbying used by 
them during the entire legislative procedure. Taking the interpretive approach to 
qualitative research and analysis of content as well as meaning (context) of the 
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empirical data will help the authors to identify the underlying motives of the 
profession to lobby against the audit reform. At this stage, the theory of profession 
will contribute to this study by presenting explanation of the motives that the 
profession might be aiming to attain and the methods they use for it. The theory of 
profession is employed, as it provides clear and appropriate headings for the actual 
motives and the methods of the profession behind the lobbying. The classification 
and explanation of the motives and methods provided by the theory and the deep 
understanding of the arguments and methods developed through the chosen 
research strategy will enable the authors to link the empirical findings with the 
theoretical motives and methods identified through the theory of profession. 
3.5 Coding process 
As mentioned in the earlier sections that the data collected for this thesis include 
the source of official documents, as well as, the interviews. The interviews 
conducted were semi-structured, that provided some room for cross-questioning to 
the interview participants. The purpose of cross questioning was to capture the 
participant's and their organizations specific viewpoints and comments on the 
matter of the three relevant articles. The coding process started with reading all the 
communication documents repeatedly and transcription the interviews. Then, data 
collected was read very carefully, to find the words that capture the key arguments 
presented by the profession and the interviewees in response to the measures in 
question. In addition, the type and timing of documents issuance and other method 
of lobbying discovered from the interviews was also taken into consideration, to 
account for the various methods used by the accounting profession to influence the 
EU institutions.  
 
In the next stage, notes were taken on the key arguments and the methods of the 
influence were identified through the data collected. The findings (arguments) were 
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arranged on three levels, for instance, level 1 – objective; level 2 – argument; level 
3 – reasoning for the argument (see Table 3). The arguments were divided in seven 
categories, such as Achievement of objectives; Difficult to implement and practice; 
Cost and administrative burden, Risk putting Europe at a competitive disadvantage; 
Unclear definitions of NAS, Reduce audit firm's ability to attract talent; and 
Commercial interest of the accounting firms.  
 
Level 1 Level 2 
 
Level 3 
 
Measure 
 
Achievement of 
objectives 
Decrease in 
audit quality 
“audit quality could be undermined as 
there is an increased threat to audit 
quality in the first years of audit, due to 
reduced knowledge of client operations 
(for the ‘new’ auditor)” (FEE, 2010). 
MFR 
Decrease in 
audit 
independence 
“A cap on non-audit fees does not make 
sense. Independence is not determined 
by an arbitrary monetary amount” 
(PWC, 2013d). 
Cap of fee 
Increase in 
market 
concentration 
“Mandatory rotation of audit firms has 
been shown (in Study on Mandatory 
Rotation of Audit Firms) to increase 
market concentration in the large firms” 
(FEE, 2010) 
MFR 
Table 3 Example of coding (arguments)  
 
The findings (methods) were codified in two levels: level 1 is a general category of 
methods and level 2 provides specific components of the methods that forms level 
1. Further the methods divided into five categories such as Official publications by 
the profession, Communication with MEPs and national representatives in EU, 
Stakeholders engagements, Propagation of ideology of audit firms from institution 
to institution, MEPs & MEPs’ assistants meet profession to acquire technical 
knowledge (see Table 4).  
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Level 1 Level 2 
Official publications by the 
profession 
Responses to Green Paper 
Press releases 
Point of views 
Briefing papers 
Debate articles in professional journals 
Policy statements 
Letters to EC 
Other documents 
Communication with MEPs and 
national representatives in EU 
Meetings with MEPs 
 
Meetings with MEP’s assistants 
Phone calls 
Swedish representatives in EU 
E-mails 
Meetings 
Round tables 
Table 4 Example of coding (methods) 
3.6 Ethical considerations 
Ethical considerations were given high level of importance through the whole 
research process, particularly due to the sensitivity of the topic, as lobbying is 
related to some negative connotation by various stakeholders of the audit reform in 
question. In the phase of data collection, the attention was focused on gathering the 
data from original sources and for interviews confidentiality and objectivity were 
the prime focus. Before the commencement of the interviews, permission was seek 
from each interviewee on the matters of recording the interview; disclosing their 
names in the list of interviewees; quoting them and if they would like to see or 
approve the materials gathered from the interviews and incorporated in the thesis. 
All the four interview participants replied positively to the four ethical matters 
discussed above (see Appendixes C and D). Thereafter, the next consideration was 
to present the findings from the interviews as impartially as possible, so as to avoid 
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chances of hampering the objectivity of the thesis. In the last stage, when the thesis 
is finalized it will be sent to the interviewees for their approval. 
3.7 Limitation of methodology  
The limitation of the research methodology is that the motivation and extent of 
lobbying cannot be measured reliably, as it is difficult to trace evidence of lobbying 
done through informal sources (Georgiou 2004). The activities of the above 
mentioned professional bodies and firms in influencing the policy making of new 
EU audit reform will be limited to three important articles of the Regulation 
537/2014, which directly affect the dynamics and economic of the business of the 
auditors in EU. These articles include Capping of non-audit fee (article 4), 
Prohibition of provision of non-audit services (article 5) and Mandatory audit firm 
rotation (article 17). As these articles appear to be the most controversially 
discussed because they seem have negative impact on the status quo and it holds 
the potential to change structure and scope of the existing audit market on a large. 
All selected interviewees except IFAC could participate in the interviews rather 
their close colleagues answer the questions. Finally, the publications of the ECG 
are accessible only for its members not to general public. 
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4 Theoretical framework and literature 
review 
The Section 4.1 discusses the characteristics and attributes that are found in the 
profession, in the light of Neo-Weberian approach of the Theory of Profession. The 
theories of the profession are used to understand the characteristics of the subject of 
this thesis i.e. the accounting profession, the motives behind their activities and the 
methods they use to achieve their objectives. Section 4.2 outlines the prior 
literature that has built upon and indicated some of the shortcomings in the theory. 
It also provides deeper understanding of the theory discussed. Lastly, Section 4.3 
presents the framework of the thesis that will guide the authors to answer the 
research question of the thesis. 
4.1 Theory of Professions 
Professions are identified as associations of gentlemen that emerge autonomously, 
to institutionalize and regulate a specific area of practice (Johnson, 1972; Larson, 
1977). Moreover, Friedson (1970) defines a profession as, an occupation that has 
assumed a dominant position so that it gains control determining the substance of 
its work and services. This is aimed to attain professional autonomy and self-
direction (Friedson, 1970).  In sociology, there are two dominant theories of 
profession in sociology Functionalist and Neo-Weberian (Brante, 1988). The well-
known theorist of Functional theory Parsons stressed the importance of the 
profession in industrial society and developed the conceptual framework for the 
analysis of the profession (Brante, 1988).  Parsons compared professional to other 
occupational groups and found that professions are "functionally specific" i.e. 
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"their authority is restricted to particular technical competence, bureaucratic 
measure, or contractual agreement" (Brante, 1988, p.121). On the other hand,  Neo-
Weberian theorists Johnson, (1972) and Larson (1977) associated activities of the 
professionals to exercise of power and pursuit of self-interest by elite groups that 
seek to create a monopoly for their services and restrict numbers in a profession so 
as to maintain fee levels and social standing. From the perspective of the subject of 
this thesis, the Neo-Weberian approach appears more realistic and suitable, as it 
explains profession's aim to promote self-interest behind its activities (Brante, 
2009), whereas, Functionalistic framework is considered to be "naive and neutral", 
 as it emphasizes that profession is driven but altruistic motive and integrated 
collective ethics (Brante, 2009).  
 
The Neo-Weberian approach can be used to explain the characteristics, motive and 
methods of the accounting profession in the context of the subject of this thesis i.e. 
the influence of the profession on the policy-making of the new EU audit reform. 
The motive behind profession’s act to influence such a regulatory process can be 
associated to and explained by the Theory of Profession. For instance, 
Faulconbridge & Muzio, (2011) claims that actors of the profession exercise their 
individual and collective power in pursuit of self-interest. In order to achieve this 
elites of the profession form a group within, that seeks to monopolize the industry 
for their service and to strengthen barriers to entry, so as to restrict market 
competition for them and to maintain the status-quo and the level of fee (Johnson, 
1972; Larson, 1977). Larson (1977) explained professionalism as the process 
through which producers of special services aim and try to create, protect and 
control a market for their expertise. Furthermore, Larson (1977) in her book The 
Rise of Professionalism argued that the profession do not only aim to exercise the 
control to raise their ethical standard but might be out of their selfishness. In 
addition, members of professions are often driven by self-interest to create 
associations in order to dictate their working conditions, pays and status 
(Faulconbridge & Muzio, 2011). 
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However, Abbott (1988) revolutionized the study of profession by arguing that 
professions do not operate independently, nor do they exist in isolation, rather 
professions exist in a broader "system" (Abbott, 1988). He focused more on the 
interprofessional competition compared to the early professions theorists. By the 
ecology or the system of profession Abbott (1988) referred to competition between 
various professions, as they seek to secure a strong position in the market. In 
Abbott’s (1988) view, the key to understanding professions is to see them in 
competition over jurisdictional disputes. Jurisdiction is the link between the 
profession and its work (Abbott, 1988). Jurisdiction can also be defined as a right 
to control the provision of particular services and activities (Abbott, 1988).  
 
Jurisdictional claim to public refers to the claim of legitimate control of profession 
on how to perform a particular kind of work, as well as, a right to exclude workers 
from the profession, to control and dominate the definition of the jurisdiction 
(Abbott, 1988). The second arena of jurisdictional claim is on the legal system, 
“which can confer formal control of work” (Abbott, 1988, p. 60). Contest of legal 
jurisdiction occur in three places: firstly, the legislature, which in some countries 
grant statutory rights to certain professional groups (p. 60). Secondly, the court, 
where such rights are enforced and the actual boundaries of loose legislative 
mandates specified (p. 60). Thirdly, the administrative or planning structure where 
legal jurisdiction can be contested (p. 60). Equally important but less discussed 
arena is workplace, claims made in the workplace blur and distort the official lines 
of legally and publicly established jurisdiction (p.60). 
 
In the case of accounting profession, Abbott's idea of jurisdictional claim on the 
legal system is directly applicable, as it has provided an essential monopoly on 
audit services and allowed the profession considerable discretion in control of their 
work environment through licensing and self-regulation (Reiter & Williams, n.d.). 
Moreover, the accounting profession also portrays a shift in the economically 
desirable work focus away from the statutory auditing to management and 
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technology consulting (Reiter & Williams, n.d.). Consequently, the large 
accounting firms have specialized in these non-audit services in order to develop 
into multi-professional organizations (Reiter & Williams, n.d.) and to claim 
jurisdiction on non-audit services, along their core activity.  
 
Abbott (1988) claims that the power build up administrative task and external co-
optation is exercised in all three settings of jurisdictional endeavour -  before the 
state, before the public and in the workplace (p. 138). Before agencies of the state, 
power is exercised by lobbying legislatures to establish licensing boards, by using 
those licensing boards against competing profession, by seeking statutory and 
judicial monopoly of services (p.138). Before, the public power is exercised 
through various forms of media coverage. In the workplace, power is exercised 
through attempts to enforce legal jurisdiction, through control of professional 
language, through direct and symbolic subordination (p.138).  
 
In relation to the subject of this study, Abbott's (1988) claim that before agencies of 
the state profession exercise its power by lobbying the law-makers or in public 
extensive power can be exercised by the profession through various form of media 
coverage (p.138). This exemplifies the methods adopted by the profession to 
maintain and control their jurisdiction on the core and non-activities, as in the case 
of accounting profession. 
 
Friedson (1986) reflects how professional powers grew out of their ‘market 
shelters’. He identified knowledge monopolies as a major source of power. The 
tacit knowledge of the profession enables it to control its work and how the work is 
to be conducted, which is labeled as ‘technical autonomy.’ This in turn leads to 
situationally specific knowledge monopolies. For instance, in the case of this thesis 
it is specialist and technical knowledge of the accounting profession, which enables 
it to regulate itself. Whereas, for regulators it might be too technical to govern or 
regulate the accounting profession, as regulators do not possess and, in fact, rely on 
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the profession for technical knowledge related to regulate it. Larson (1977) states 
that the power approach focuses on the political and social processes, that the 
professions secure and reproduce their privileged position in society. 
 
The similarities drawn from the general characteristics and definitions of profession 
by Theory of Profession can be useful in studying the accounting profession in 
particular. These characteristics explicitly point towards some of the common 
motives methods that shape the profession. For instance, to exercise their control 
and dominance on the jurisdiction, to secure self-regulation, compete with other 
professions to strengthen their position in the market. In addition, they form groups 
within the profession to monopolies the industry and lastly, they compete between 
professions to claim their own jurisdiction. These characteristics will be used to 
explain the motives and methods of the accounting profession behind their act to 
influence the regulators. 
4.2 Literature review 
4.2.1 Studies using the theory of profession 
The following section will outline research literature that has used the Theory of 
Profession to find the characteristics and traits of profession that either explains or 
contradicts their findings. To begin with, slightly similar to the subject of this thesis 
is the research conducted by Reiter & Williams (n. d.) who discuss the conflict 
between the large accounting firms (the profession) and the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (the regulator) on the proposals to prohibit certain types of 
work for audit clients. They examine the crisis in the public accounting profession 
in light of Abbott’s (1988) theory of the system of professions.  They use the theory 
to understand the dynamics of the controversies in accounting, which center around 
the key professional concept of independence. In the study Reiter & Williams (n. 
d.) supported Abbott’s view that professions struggle continuously to maintain and 
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control of their professional jurisdiction. However, it has not been discussed in the 
article how does the profession try to achieve the control or aims to maintain its 
jurisdiction. 
 
Further, Reiter and William (2012) conducted another study using theories of 
professionalism by Friedson (1986, 1994, 2001) and Abbott (1988), to help in 
understanding the implication of Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) for the accounting 
profession as well as for the public interest. The article also explains why the public 
interest orientation of the profession is of importance and how the takeover of 
auditing standards by the government can potentially diminish the accounting 
profession’s commitment to the public interest. In light of the Abbott (1988) and 
Friedson (2001) the authors discuss their finding as implication of SOX can have 
serious consequences for the accounting profession as it loose control as well as its 
economic monopoly on its professional work. With reference to the sociological 
theories of professions, they explained that it is the economic interests that is at the 
core of the professional project and when the perceived economic value of non-
core services, such as information technology and management consulting 
outweigh the economic value of the core activity (auditing), the problems arise 
(Reiter & Williams, 2012). At this point, the motivation of the accounting 
profession to secure the value of its core activity diminishes (Reiter & Williams, 
2012). Moreover, they also discuss that as a consequence of SOX the jurisdiction of 
auditors will become limited to merely policing the corporations. 
 
Bianic (2003) discusses the role of the state in professionalization, in the context of 
France. In addition, the relationship between state and the profession. He uses the 
work of the Neo-Weberian theorists including Friedson (2001), Larson (1977) and 
Abbott (1988) to analyze the uniqueness of the French model of 
professionalization. Where, Friedson's and Abbott's claim that the state plays a 
secondary role in professionalization is discussed. The author found that there are 
at least three important issues regarding the relations between state and profession. 
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At the first stage, Bianic (2003) figured out that professions do not only depend on 
jurisdictional struggle and the state has a much important role in the activities of 
the ecology of the profession. These finding contrasted and therefore, questioned 
the theory proposed by Abbott (1988). At the second stage it was found that the 
contrasting degree of state involvement in Continental countries and Anglo-
American countries should not be overstated. At the final stage it was discussed 
that to understand the relationship between state and profession not only nation-
state context should be considered, rather international regulation should also be 
taken into consideration as it governs the jurisdictional claims. 
 
Sikka and Willmott (1995) describe that accountant are part of the system that was 
introduced by Abbott (1988) as “the system of professions”. They begin by 
discussing Abbott's view, that like other professional groups accountants also 
struggle to diversify and protect their area of jurisdiction to compete with their rival 
profession. However, they argue that in doing so accountancy profession face 
challenges from those who seek to occupy its territory. Moreover, journalists, 
academics and politicians advance some competing discourses that may disrupt and 
weaken the profession’s capacity to secure and expand its domain. The paper also 
argues that in trying to define, defend and extend its jurisdiction, concerns get 
attached to accounting profession "independence". Therefore, profession uses 
variety of tactics, such as, revising its ethical guidelines, refining its disciplinary 
arrangements, as well as by mobilizing other agencies, including the state, 
politicians, media, accounting academics, etc., in order to support its claims, to 
reduce threats to its self-regulation and to redefine the terrain on which it combats 
its challengers.  
4.2.2  Prior research on lobbying by auditors  
This section particularly highlights the ways adopted by the accounting profession, 
in order, to fulfill its motives identified in the previous two sections. A substantial 
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amount of literature in the past is focused on studying the lobbying act, motive and 
methods used by accounting profession in the context of accounting standard-
setting in the USA. A more recent study conducted by Allen et al., (2014) discusses 
lobbying and the role of Big N auditors, over Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles (GAAP) for initial thirty-four years of the Financial Accounting 
Standard Board (FASB) (1973-2006), in the U.S.A. They generally describe the 
lobbying incentives for auditors in three broad categories i.e. catering to client's 
preferences for flexibility in the regulation, in their self-interest and being 
conceptually aligned with the FASB. The method of lobbying they use in their 
analysis is the submission of comment letter to FASB. Their findings indicate that 
expected litigation costs and the threat of regulatory scrutiny as a reason behind 
auditor lobbying. Linked to audit firms private interest and client's interest Puro 
(1984) discusses auditors lobbying behaviors at the time when new standard are 
considered by FASB. To explain both of the interests Puro (1984) uses the model 
of the economics theory of regulation (Stigler, 1975) and the agency theory 
perspective (Jensen & Meckling 1975), respectively. Puro (1984) argues that 
lobbying is done when the lobbying party expects large financial benefits.  
 
Similarly, Burnett et al (2013) discusses the indirect form of lobbying done by 
accounting firms by influencing politicians and regulators, and the direct form by 
submission of comment letter, to promote the interest of their audit client. In the 
context of U.K, Georgiou (2004) discusses corporate lobbying through auditors to 
influence the Accounting Standard Board (ASB) in the U.K. This article discuss the 
method of lobbying employed by corporate managers which includes appealing to 
their auditors, private meetings with Accounting Standard Board (ASB) members 
and staff and submission of comment letters. Manson and Zaman (1993) studies 
lobbying of accounting firms with respect audit standard setting. To understand the 
nature, kind of responses and argument auditors advance to strengthen their 
position. They use the comment letters issued by the profession to the Consultative 
Paper and the Exposure Draft, to examine the form of lobbying.  
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Studies have mostly focused on the U.S, as the lobbying profession there is much 
older and thus more developed. However, in the EU context lobbying profession 
started to develop much later, thus the literature available is also limited. Moreover, 
the studies conducted on audit reforms and policy-making in the EU is also found 
to be limited. However, the most significant studies discussing and contributing to 
the literature on regulating audit in EU are Humphrey et al, 2011 and Samsonova-
Taddei & Humphrey, 2015. Samsonova-Taddei & Humphrey (2015) is one of the 
few studies that discuss the policy campaign launched by large international 
accounting firms, to limit the civil liability for statutory auditors after the incident 
of collapse of Arthur Andersen. The study further analyses the European 
transnational audit policy-making processes through which such decisions are made 
and the factors that restricted firms from securing the exact EU-wide solution with 
respect to limiting auditor liability in the professions private interest (Samsonova-
Taddei & Humphrey, 2015). This study discusses the influence of accounting 
profession in EU policy making with respect to the 8th audit Directive 2006 and 
found that the large accounting firms tried to mobilize relevant EU institutions with 
the aim of changing the Member States’ auditor liability arrangements. However, 
they the firms failed in their struggle (Samsonova-Taddei & Humphrey, 2015).  
  
Prior literature on standard-setting and policy making has discussed the concept of 
power as an important feature for lobbying. As it is the amount of power that gives 
the lobbyists ability to influence the due process in their self-interest or the interest 
they are pursuing. Therefore, in order to synergies their power, the large accounting 
firm made significant development in the 1990 by creating associational 
organizations, both in the EU and the US (Humphrey et al., 2009). In Europe, the 
associational body became known as the European Contact Group (ECG) 
(Humphrey et al., 2009). The objective behind its formation was to coordinate the 
opinions of the firms, so that a united and a more strong opinion can be presented 
to the EC on various proposed audit regulatory initiatives (Manardo, 1996 and 
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Røder, 2001). Later, the accounting firms collectively establish a Global Steering 
Committee (GSC) on the model of ECG, to deal with their common concerns 
relating to regulatory and professional issues on a global basis (Morris, 2001). An 
important project for the GSC was to strengthen IFAC both as the self-regulatory 
body for the international profession and as global audit standard setter (see 
Humphrey et al., 2009). The accounting firms pursued this interest by making 
substantial direct contributions to IFAC’s budget, and were allocated seats on each 
of IFAC's standard-setting boards to become centrally involved with IFAC’s 
reforms (see Humphrey et al., 2009). To increase the involvement in international 
regulatory affairs the large accounting firms' extended the scale of their financial 
support to IFAC, which now receives approximately one-third of its funding from 
the large firms (Humphrey & Loft, 2011). Later, ECG together with FEE played a 
major role in advocating the professions case for limiting the auditors liability with 
respect to the EU 8th audit Directive 2006 (Samsonova-Taddei & Humphrey, 
2015). The examples mentioned above provides evidence of exercise of power by 
accounting profession, through different sources and regulatory bodies, to influence 
the policy making in their private interest or least to reduce the magnitude of the 
effects, the new reform can have on the economics of their business. 
 
Moreover, the new EU audit reform of 2014 is only discussed by few researchers. 
A significant debate appears in Humphrey et al. (2011) which provide a critical 
stance on the important issues raised in the Green Paper 2010, to be included in the 
new EU audit reform of 2014. This research is aimed at enhancing the 
understanding of the contemporary regulatory mindset of the EC and to contribute 
to the policy debate. However, the influence of accounting profession in the policy 
making of the new EU audit reform is not discussed yet. In addition, to the 
objective of contributing to the research landscape by addressing this gap, it is 
particularly interesting to study the response and influence of accounting 
profession, as Samsonova-Taddei & Humphrey (2015) emphasized that they are the 
direct recipient of the reform. Furthermore, most commonly used method in the 
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prior literature, with exception to Georgiou (2004) and Samsonova-Taddei & 
Humphrey (2015), is the analysis of the comment letters, which only provides one-
sided information. This thesis aims to conduct interviews with people concerned 
and analyze a range of documents in order to make a more reliable and complete 
analysis.  
4.3 Analytical framework  
In light of the general theories of profession described in Section 4.1, this thesis 
will draw upon  and study the characteristics of the accounting profession, in order 
to understand the possible motives that the profession might be willing to achieve 
by influencing the EU audit reform. Additionally, studies using Theory of 
Profession in Section 4.2 will contribute towards developing a deeper 
understanding of what are the motives of the accounting profession to lobby. 
Drawing from the findings and discussions of these researchers, this thesis will 
build upon its arguments to answer the first part of its research question i.e. why do 
the accounting profession lobby against new EU audit reform. Further, the 
shortcomings found and the critique presented by Bianic (2003) and Sikka and 
Willmott (1995) to Abbott's theory of profession, indicates that theory of profession 
might not be applicable in every case, for instance, Bianic (2003) claims that in 
discussing the relationship between state and profession with nation-state context, 
international regulation should also be taken into consideration as it governs the 
jurisdictional claims. This will help the authors in having a more nuanced view to 
developing and supporting the pro and contra arguments, in relation to the 
relevance of the theory to their findings and analysis. 
 
Further, the most common method adopted by accounting profession in order to 
exercise their influence, is to submit comment letters, as evident from studies 
mentioned above. Other methods include, directly influencing the standard setters 
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by conducting meetings with them; creation of organizational associations, such as, 
ECG in the EU to collectively and more strongly advocate the interest of the 
accounting profession; funding provided by the profession to standard setting and 
regulatory bodies, such as, IFAC and securing seats on the board of these bodies to 
directly influence the decision making of these bodies. Drawing from the literature 
mentioned above and the Theory of Profession, this thesis aims to answer the 
second part of its research question i.e. how does the accounting profession lobby 
against the new EU audit reform and identify the method used by the accounting 
profession (see Fig. 2). In addition, the EU law making process and lobbying EU 
institutions described in chapter two will help identifying different types and extent 
of lobbying EU institutions are subjected to.  
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Figure 2 Framework of the Thesis 
  
 
Council of 
Ministers 
European 
Parliament  
(JURI and ECON 
Committees) 
 
Final 
Legislation 
European 
Commission 
 
Accounting 
profession 
Motives 
- Theory of profession 
1. Larson, 1977; Johnson, 1972: 
a) self-interest; 
b) seeks monopolize industry;  
c) to maintain the status-quo and level of fee; 
d) to protect and control the market for own expertise.  
 
2. Freidson, 1970: 
a) self-regulation (control the work); 
b) professional autonomy. 
 
3. Abbott, 1988: 
a) seeks to secure strong position on the market; 
b) seeks to control and dominate definition of jurisdictions 
c) seeks formal control of work; 
d) seeks statutory and judicial monopoly of services. 
 
- Studies used the theory of profession 
1.  Reiter & William, n. d: 
Supports Abbott theory:  profession struggles to maintain 
and control its jurisdictions 
2. Reiter & William, 2012: 
In line with Abbott and Freidson, as a result of regulation 
(SOX), the jurisdictions of auditors will be limiters; loss of 
control and economic monopoly on professional work will be 
consequence of SOX 
Bianic, 2003: 
Argues against Abbott: profession does not only depend on 
jurisdictional struggle; state has much important role in the 
activities of profession  
Sikka & Willmott, 1995: 
Professional groups of accountants struggle to diversified 
and protect their area of jurisdictions; however, other 
professions also seek to occupy its territory; they reduce 
threats for self-regulation   
 
Methods  
- Theory of profession 
1. Larson, 1977; Johnson, 1972: 
a) exercise individual and collective power; 
b) professional elites form a group. 
 
2. Larson, 1977: 
a) create associations in order to dictate working conditions, 
pays and status. 
 
3. Freidson, 1970: 
c) knowledge monopoly as a major source of power 
a) control the work though specialist knowledge  
 
4. Abbott, 1988: 
a) compete between various professions 
b) lobby legislature to seek statutory and judicial monopoly 
of services. 
 
- Studies used the theory of profession 
1. Sikka & Willmott, 1995: 
Profession mobilizes other agencies (politicians, media, 
academics)   
 
- Methods of influence from prior literature 
Georgiou, 2004; Humphrey et al, 2009;  
Submission of comment letters; meetings with regulators; 
creation of organizational associations (ECG); findings by 
profession to regulators; securing seats on boards of 
regulatory bodies   
 
Samsonova-Taddei & Humphrey (2015):  
Public consultation, committee member- 
ship, meetings with the representatives of individual 
Member States, direct engagement with the preparation 
of officially commissioned reports, direct lobbying and 
behind-the-scenes interactions 
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5 Empirical Evidence and Findings 
This chapter will present the findings that are driven from the data collected. The 
findings will be divided into two parts, based on the research question of this thesis. 
Section 5.1 will outline the apparent and embedded motives and reasoning 
presented by members of the accounting profession, identified in earlier sections. 
Subsequently, Section 5.2 will present the various ways adopted by the profession 
to channelize their concerns and to exercise their influence on the regulators, so as 
to get their voices heard. Each of the sections will include evidences collected from 
the text and the verbal documents issued and the interviews. Lastly, Section 5.3 
will summarize the finding and give a direction leading to the analysis chapter of 
this thesis. 
5.1 Arguments by accounting profession  
In the course for studying the general response of the profession towards the 
proposal of the EU audit reform, it was found that the profession supports and 
welcomes the initiative. However, some of the articles, as discussed in earlier 
sections, came out to be more controversial and got strongly opposed by the 
accounting profession. These articles include, MFR; prohibition of NAS and 
capping of fees on NAS. 
5.1.1 Findings from verbal and text data 
 
In the process of channelizing the response to the proposal and opposing the 
controversial articles the profession issued various documents, for instance, 
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response to the Green Paper, point of views, briefing papers, press releases and 
letters to the EC. Apparently, there were many reasons that come to the surface for 
opposition of the above-mentioned articles, but some reasons were put forward 
repeatedly and appeared to be much more emphasized upon compared to others. 
 Achievement of objectives  
 Decrease in audit quality 
The reason that takes the lead for the opposition is that MFR and prohibition of 
NAS will directly have negative consequences on the quality of the audit 
performed (FAR, 2010, 2011; FEE, 2010; KPMG, 2012; PwC, 2012; EY, 2014a). 
EGIAN in their position paper mention that the profession argues that audit firm 
rotation of 6 years, as proposed in the Green Paper (GP) is a very short time span 
(EGIAN, 2012). According to the members of the profession this will lead to 
adverse effects on audit quality as to the companies were firms are doing first year 
audit, will not have enough knowledge of the business (FEE, 2011a), its 
environment and the risks it is exposed to (Deloitte, 2011). Therefore, first year 
audit will be of lower quality, which might lead to even more financial failures. 
This implies that knowledge of business obtained over years lead to better quality 
of audit being performed. Therefore, various suggestions have been made to EC to 
extend the rotation period by the different members of the profession.  
 
The prohibition of NAS has also received strong opposition from the profession, as 
it believes that  complex audits require expertise and competence of multi-
disciplinary teams (Grant Thornton, 2010 and Deloitte 2010), as they can offer  a 
combination of experience, judgment and specialist skills, such as, actuaries, 
taxation experts, valuation experts etc, for performing high quality audit. These 
teams will simply not be maintained in house with the 'audit-only' status of the 
firms. Therefore, if audit firms will not be able to provide these services, they will 
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have to rely on the work of external experts (IFAC, 2011), for which the quality of 
work, ethical considerations and reliability cannot be assured. In this regard, a 
collective suggestion was made by the profession to adopt IESBA’s Code of Ethics 
and to follow a 'threat and safeguard' approach to providing NAS, instead to 
prohibiting them completely. The profession thus, claims that these articles will not 
achieve EC's objective of improving audit quality, rather will have undesirable 
consequences on audit quality. Moreover, introduction 10% fee cap in the proposal 
2011 on permissible non-audit services has also faced negative response from the 
profession (FEE, 2011b). 
 
MFR and prohibition of NAS was further opposed by mainly the professional 
bodies and the audit firms, because it will lead to loss of knowledge of the previous 
clients and the expert skills and competencies that were maintained in the audit 
firms (FEE, 2012a; KPMG, 2014; FAR, 2012d), prior to these articles coming into 
effect. In addition, mandatory rotation will lead to constant disruption in the 
operations of firms after every fixed interval (PwC, 2013a; FEE, 2011b and FEE, 
2011c).  
 
Furthermore, in the studies conducted by FAR and PwC it became evident that the 
vast majority of the respondents opposed the three articles (PwC, 2011a and FAR, 
2012c) expressing their concerns on the far-reaching impacts of these articles, as 
they believe that the results might be counterproductive (FEE, 2011b), in terms of 
audit quality, cost and flexibility and choice available to the businesses (PwC, 
2011a). 
 Decrease in audit’s independence 
Secondly, these articles came under mild opposition by the profession on the matter 
of assuring auditors independence (FAR, 2012b; Deloitte 2012; FEE, 2014a) which 
was one of the prime reasons for EC to issue the proposal of the audit reform. The 
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article of mandatory firm rotation was introduced to eliminate the possibility of 
development of over-familiarity between the audit firms and its clients, which can 
hamper objectivity and professional skepticism of the auditor while performing the 
audit. However, audit firms argue that many countries do not have such 
requirements, but some who have like Italy provides little or no evidence that 
mandatory firm rotation can improve audit quality or increase auditor's 
independence (Deloitte, 2012). Further, the profession claims that in the Code of 
Ethics requirement of audit partner rotation in 7 years already exist and is sufficient 
( FAR, 2010; PwC, 2010; KPMG, 2010).  
 
In addition, as a reason to oppose MFR, the profession puts forward that the studies 
suggest that mandatory audit firm rotation at regular arbitrary intervals will 
significantly add to the cost of the business that will outweigh any perceived 
benefits of the rotation. In this regard, FEE (2013a) responded by favoring the 
black list approach for the prohibition of NAS that could pose a significant threat to 
auditors’ independence and for which no safeguards exist. However, the profession 
demanded that to be effective such a list should be consistent internationally, to 
avoid unmanageable fragmentation in the regulation (FEE, 2013a). FEE (2013a) 
and PwC recommended that incorporating the IESBA’s list of prohibited NAS into 
the proposed Regulation, as the content of this list is broadly in line with the 
proposals already made by the European Parliament’s Committee on Legal Affairs 
(JURI). On the matter of fee cap PwC (2013d) appeared to be strongly vocal, as it 
says any such cap does not make sense. Independence is not determined by an 
arbitrary monetary amount. 
 Increase on market concentration 
Thirdly, one of the most discussed reasons of the financial crises is also the high 
market concentration in the audit market (FEE, 2010; PwC, 2010; Deloitte, 2010; 
and Grant Thornton, 2010). This refers to the oligopoly of the audit firms. 
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Therefore, mandatory firm rotation was also aimed at targeting and reducing this 
concentration. With mandatory firm rotation, EC aims to encourage more 
competition in the market by allowing more firms to enter and thereby diluting the 
market concentration. However, especially large audit firms argue in light of the 
Bocconi University's review of the literature 2005 that mandatory rotation leads to 
greater concentration of work amongst the largest firms (FEE, 2010; PwC, 2010; 
Deloitte, 2010; Grant Thornton, 2010; FEE, 2011a; FEE, 2011b). During the study 
of the overall reaction of the profession, it also appeared that even the mid-tier 
firms do not support the mandatory rotation, as a means to reducing the market 
concentration (BDO, 2010 and Grant Thornton, 2010). According to Grant 
Thornton (2010) MFR will not reduce concentration and because of the bias 
towards the Big Four, rather there is a risk that it will increase market 
concentration. Therefore, the profession suggests that such interventions should not 
be made; rather it should be left to the market. 
 Difficult to implement and practice 
The members of the profession further claim that mandatory firm rotation and 
prohibition of NAS can be very difficult to implement in practice for the multi-
national companies (Deloitte, 2010 and FAR, 2012b). FAR gives an example that 
merger plans are difficult to achieve. With regards to NAS, suggestions have been 
made that categories of such services should be defined more carefully and further 
explanation and clarification have also been asked for services that are permissible 
based on their materiality (Deloitte, 2012). Here materiality is a point of concern, 
as it is hard to establish materiality depends on what. Further, it has also been put 
forward by the profession that such strict prohibition of provision of services will 
weaken the general economics of the audit firms (Deloitte, 2010; PwC, 2011b), as 
will entirely be dependent on audit services for their operation to be profitable. In 
addition with mandatory firm rotation the audit market may also contract for the 
audit firms. This might lead to significant rise in the price of audit, which might 
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eventually be shifted to the clients. In this regard, the profession shares its concern 
that such a business model of 'audit-only' firm would not be sustainable (Grant 
Thornton, 2010). 
 Cost and administrative burden  
FEE (2013a, 2014) claims that it welcomes a "black list" of NAS if it is consistent 
with international standards to enhance credibility and minimize administrative 
burdens. Moreover, a "black list" only approach provides more legal certainty than 
the cumbersome proposals of the EC. However, in line with the proposal made by 
the JURI, to oppose the proposal FEE also comments that it would be rather 
difficult to reconcile any such cap on fees of NAS with proposed "black list" 
approach and that the cap will immensely add on to the administrative burden of 
the firm. Moreover, the opposition to MFR by the profession was also reasoned to 
be the increase in financial cost and administrative burden for the businesses (FEE, 
2010; PwC, 2010; Deloitte, 2010; PwC, 2011b; FAR, 2011; KPMG 2014; FEE, 
2014a and IFAC, 2011).  
 
Although in the response to the Green Paper and press releases the audit firms 
accept that cost consideration should not be a decisive argument when discussed 
the prime matter of audit quality. However, they also point out that frequent 
mandatory rotation in 6 years could substantially add to the cost of the businesses. 
 By cost Deloitte (2010) refer to the internal costs of explaining its business and 
processes to the new audit team. Overall, the point of view of the profession on the 
matters of MFR, prohibition of NAS and capping of fee on NAS appears to be 
consistent and firm on the matter that through these proposals the choice for 
stakeholders will become restricted, whereas, the cost will increase considerably. 
Moreover, will be it the discretion of the audit committee and the companies of the 
board of directors in their choice of audit firms.  
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 Risk putting Europe at a competitive disadvantage  
According to PwC (2013a) MFR has generally been rejected in US and Europe and 
if any such regulation is implemented it will put Europe to competitive 
disadvantage (PwC, 2013e and FEE, 2012a). FEE (2012a) claims  that these 
reforms will particularly isolate Europe from the global market at the time of 
financial crises, as both MFR and prohibition of NAS is deemed to have negative 
effects on the European audit business, in terms of cost and quality of audit.  
 Unclear definition of NAS 
With regards to NAS, the accounting profession argues that the definition of NAS 
in the GP is not clear. According to Deloitte “we would suggest that categories of 
non-audit services be defined carefully (for example, any special work or reports 
required by prudential authorities that are best provided by the auditor would be 
disclosed as audit-related services)” (Deloitte, 2010, p. 14).  
 Reduce audit firm's ability to attract talent 
The profession claims in its criticism to the creation of pure audit firms that 
Prohibition of NAS will reduce audit firms ability to attract and hire talent with 
specialist skills. For instance, E&Y argues that having audit-only firms could 
negatively affect audit quality as firm will not be able to hire high-quality 
specialists” (E&Y, 2010, p. 12). Therefore, audit firms need expert and competent 
multi-disciplinary team. In this context Grant Thornton claims that “the range and 
depth of skills offered by multi-disciplinary firms enhances the quality and 
efficiency of both audit and NAS” (Grant Thornton, 2010, p. 14).  
 Commercial interest of profession  
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It has been found that the profession has highlighted its commercial considerations 
as a factor of opposing the three relevant measures included in the reform. For 
instance, Deloitte (2010) argued that the prohibition of NAS will weaken the 
general economics of audit firm. Additionally, Grant Thornton (2010) claimed that 
the creation of pure audit firms will undermine the financial strength of the audit 
firms and will restrict the firm's opportunity to extend its infrastructure. Thus, the 
business model of an audit only firm would be unsustainable according to Grant 
Thornton (2010).  
5.1.2 Findings from interviews  
 Difficult to implement and practice  
During the interviews it became evident that the measures in the reform will be 
difficult to implement and practice. For instance, according to Ms. Noémi Robert, 
audit and assurance manager FEE "the provisions of the proposal were not feasible 
to the market at all”. In addition Mr. Gary Pflugrath (IFAC) expressed that "It 
might be challenges with implementation, we might have 28 different versions of 
regulation across Europe". 
 Achievement of objectives   
Secondly, the interviewees argued that it will be hard for the reform to achieve its 
objective. In the views of Mr. Cooper "the reform will not tackle the problem that 
needs to be tackled”. Mr. Cooper also noted profession’s view of the reform as they 
think that "the proposal was completely unnecessary, poorly thought out and should 
be watered down as much as possible". Mr. Gary Pflugrath (IFAC) added that "we 
are not sure that those measures (NAS and MFR) will achieve the objectives of the 
regulation". In addition, Ms. Helene Agélii (FAR) said "this regulation has so many 
rules that en application might lead to unintended effects and contradict the 
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objectives of the audit reform". By this she referred to increase in market 
concentration: “the Regulation might rather increase than decrease the market 
concentration to Big Four; “Also I do not think that audit quality will be enhanced 
as per the objective of the reform” and that "there are no evidence that these three 
articles will have the intended effect on the independence". Mr. Gary Pflugrath 
(IFAC) shared his view by saying "There is not sufficient evidence to support that 
the MFR and further prohibition of NAS will achieve the objectives of the 
regulation because the academic research on the topic is mixed". 
 Unclear definition of NAS  
Thirdly, the opposition on the matter of prohibition of NAS, was broadly attributed 
to unclear provision in the regulation for NAS and auditors are already prohibited 
from providing some NAS. According to Ms. Noémi Robert "FEE advocated of 
adoption of the Code of Ethics, instead of what was proposed in the Regulation". 
On the same line Mr. Harry added that "if the profession oppose, claiming that the 
regulation already exist, then we should listen to them". In addition, Ms. Agélii 
added that “Article 5 (Prohibition of NAS) is black or white, which is not a very 
efficient way to go”. Moreover, she shared that a prohibition list is a very static tool 
and FAR supports a principle-based approach.  
 Cost and administrative burden 
Fourthly, the interviewees supported the argument presented in the data that these 
measures will substantially add to the administrative burden of the businesses and 
cost for both businesses and audit firms. For instance, regarding the capping of fee 
of NAS, Ms. Noémi Robert expressed FEE's concern related to the increase in 
administrative burden for the audit clients. Whereas, Ms. Helene Agélii “noted that 
there will also be a lot of cost related to compliance and administration”. She said 
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that "there will be big cost related to compliance with the rules of the regulation 
and it is difficult to understand how that will increase audit quality”. 
 Commercial interest of the profession  
Lastly, the strong opposition to the reform by the accounting profession can also be 
regarded to the commercial interests of the accounting profession. For instance, Mr. 
Cooper pointed out that the profession claims that the reform is not in public 
interest but “I would say neither it is in the interest of the shareholders and the Big 
Four". Moreover, in relation to, limited profitability He added that "the profession 
is resistant to accept the reform because it does not want its market to get shaken 
up, endanger its revenue streams, highlights its long-standing relationships and its 
liability implications".  
 
In addition, the opposition was also targeted towards limited profitability of the 
audit service and the rising demand and pay-off from the NAS. This view became 
strengthened when Mr. Cooper commented that "audit is not a very profitable part 
of the business anymore and that is why there is a big growth in NAS". Ms. Helene 
Agélii also shared the same concern by saying that "in the long run big audit firms 
will be questioning how important it is to have audit assignment, and they might 
find more interesting to provide other services that are not as regulated as audits". 
 
5.2 Methods 
This section will describe the various ways adopted by the members of the 
accounting profession, to express their concerns related to the three controversial 
articles of the audit reform. Additionally, it will also incorporate how the 
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profession made suggestion that it deemed more appropriate and effective in 
achieving the overall objective of the reform. 
5.2.1 Findings from verbal and text data 
 
In 2010, each member of the accounting profession, apart from other stakeholders 
submitted their response to the Green Paper, invited by the EC. In the responses to 
the Green Paper they present their views, concerns and suggestions to the 
measures, to be incorporated in the legislation. From the accounting profession, the 
responses and the communication by IFAC and each of the six audit firms were 
presented on an international level; FEE and EGIAN on a regional level and FAR 
on a national level. It was found from these responses that the profession is deeply 
concerned about and strongly opposes the measures of MFR and Prohibition of 
NAS.  
  
In November 2011, EC published the draft legislative proposal. After the deadline 
of receiving responses to the GP was over, in November 2011, EC published the 
draft legislative proposal, in the regulation the EC introduced various measures, 
such as, mandatory rotation of audit firms after a maximum period of 6 years (EC, 
2011a); a 10% cap on the fee received by the audit firm on the provision of the 
audit related services to client (EC, 2011a); creation of audit-only firms and strict 
restriction on audit firms on providing NAS. The legislative proposal was sent to 
both the Council and the EP, in EP the responsible committee JURI was suppose to 
discuss and vote on the report, prepared by the rapporteur Sajjad Karim and then 
send forward for the plenary debate. The documents issued by the profession 
contained the opposition and concerns related to approval of these three 
controversial measures. To these strict measures introduced in the proposal, FEE 
issued it briefing paper (2011a), news release (2011b) article in parliament 
magazine (2011c), president speech in the Parliament (2012a) and Policy statement 
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(2012b). FAR issued a debate article published in Dagens Industri (2011), an 
interview (2012b), press releases (2012c, e) and point of views (2012d). Ernst & 
Young issued its point of view (EY, 2011). PwC published its press release (PwC, 
2011a, b) and point of view (2012). Other documents were also issued, for instance, 
IFAC responded to the PCAOB concept release on auditor independence and audit 
firm rotation.  
  
In April 2013, voting in the JURI committee was held and two reports were 
published by the committee. The report related to the regulation incorporated 
number of amendments to the original proposal made by the EC. In the report 
relating to the regulation, JURI committee proposed the duration of MFR to 
increase from 6 to 14 years. For Prohibition of NAS the committee proposed the 
adoption of IESBA code of ethics, instead of EC proposal related to independence. 
The matter of cap on the fee of non-audit services was proposed to be deleted, in 
the JURI committee's report. In response to these proposed amendments FEE 
issued an article by the name audit policy under the Lithuanian Presidency and 
appeared to be in line the JURI committee, on the matters of Prohibition on NAS 
(FEE, 2013b). PwC (2013e) issued a press release to EP's JURI Committee vote on 
audit proposal, where PwC appeared relatively convinced on the effectiveness of 
the draft legislation; however, it was still concerned that MFR could be 
counterproductive to audit quality. In May 2013, a debate in the European Council 
was held, where each Member State presented their then current views on the Irish 
Presidency proposed compromise amendments with regard to three much debated 
topics: the prohibition of non-audit services and mandatory audit firm rotation 
(FEE, 2013b). To this debate in the council, FEE issued a press release (2013a). 
  
In December 2013, the EP and the member states agreed upon compromise reached 
on the controversial reform proposed by the EC. The compromise that was reached 
requires audit firms to rotate after an engagement period of 10 years; for NAS audit 
firm will be strictly prohibited from providing non-audit services to their audit 
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clients, the strict restriction also includes tax advice and services linked to the 
financial and investment strategy of the audit client and a cap of 70% on the fee of 
permissible NAS is introduced, where the cap will be computed on the three year 
average of the audit fee received from the client (EC, 2013). The reaction of the 
profession to the compromise reached between the EP and the member states in the 
'Trialogue' was unwelcoming and shared its disappointment; due to the reason that 
they believed that the amended proposal will increase the cost and the complexity 
for the businesses. The profession appeared to fall back to the arguments it made 
against the proposal and PwC suggested that "We would urge both the European 
Parliament and the member state governments to look again at this regulation with 
the aim of making significant changes or face introducing a law that will place 
European business at serious competitive disadvantage," added Mr Sexton (PwC, 
2013e).  
  
In April 2014, final voting on EU audit reform in EP took place and the final act 
got adopted by the Council. To which FEE reacted by issuing a news release, 
stating its concern over the consistency required in the interpretation and approach 
to the MFR and Prohibition of NAS (FEE, 2014b). KPMG issued its views that 
they continue to believe that mandatory firm rotation combined with significant 
restrictions on non-audit services, will inevitably reduce choice for shareholders, 
while increasing costs and complexity (KPMG, 2014). PwC shared its concern that 
other changes will have the effect of reducing competition and shareholder choice 
(PwC, 2014). Audit committees and shareholders are best placed to decide who 
their auditors and non-audit service providers should be and this legislation takes 
power away from them. It would be wise to review the effectiveness of such 
measures after an appropriate period. BDO shared its disappointment (BDO, 2014).  
(see Figure 3). 
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Responses to Green Paper                                                                              Letters to EP, Press releases (E&Y,                                                
(IFAC, FEE, FAR,                                                                                                          FEE, PWC, FAR) 
Deloitte, E&Y, KPMG,  
PWC, BDO, GT, and EGIAN)                                                                                                                                                                                     
 
 
 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Green Paper                Legislative Proposal                                 Vote in Committee (JURI),                Decision by the EP,  
 31/10/10                            published                                                       1-st reading                                   1-st reading                             
                                             30/11-11                                                       25/04/13                                               03/04/14 
                                                                                
                                                  
                                                  
                                                   Briefing papers, News releases,                                                       Press  
                                                  Speech in EP, Policy statements,                                                      releases  
                                                 Debate articles, Point of views (IFAC,                                           (Responses to the  
                                                       FEE, FAR, Deloitte, E&Y, KPMG,                                                 decision by the EP)(FEE,  
                                                           PWC, BDO, GT, and EGIAN                                                        FAR, BDO, PWC, E&Y) 
 
Figure 3 Lobbying key events of Ordinary Legislative Procedure  
 
Apart from the exertion of influence through issuance of the formal document by 
the concerned professional bodies and the audit firms, this thesis has looked into 
the interviews given by the heads of these organization and some MEPs. For 
instance, an interview was given by Mr. Dan Brännström to the Swedish Better 
Regulation Council and published in its press release. He was asked, what has FAR 
done to promote its views on the audit reform? To which he replied, "we are very 
active and had dialogues with politicians and other actors in Sweden and Brussels" 
(FAR, 2012b). Moving on, a Swedish MEP, Cecilia Wikström was quoted in her 
interview with Swedish professional magazine Balans, saying that she thinks that 
"it was scary and unbelievably difficult to listen to Big 4 and it was the most 
aggressive lobbying campaign that I have experienced during my 5 years in 
Brussel" (Lennartsson, 2014).  Moreover, she stressed that the lobbying concern the 
Big 4 at International level (Lennartsson, 2014). Furthermore, Spanish MEP 
Antonio Masip Hidalgo, the Socialist shadow rapporteur in the legal affairs 
committee, was quoted in EurActive, where he told the conference that he backed 
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strong regulations and decried lobbying efforts by large audit firms (Fleming, 
2013). He wrote to the former president of the Parliament, Jerzy Buzek in 2011 that 
someone representing the interests of the sector threatened him by saying “he 
would do his best to sink me personally and to have me rejected by my party”, if he 
did not drop his opposition to the Big Four audit firms (Fleming, 2013). In addition 
Barnier was quoted saying that “Considering the major issues in our proposal it is 
normal there are a lot of discussions and that these are not always easy, even if I do 
sometimes find them a bit aggressive towards me” (Fleming, 2013) (see Fig. 4). 
 
 
 
  
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 Publications by the profession 
5.2.2 Findings from interviews  
 Publications by profession 
During the Interview it was identified that the profession uses various official 
documents to influence the audit reform. According to Ms. Noémi Robert, apart 
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Point of views 
Briefing papers 
Debate articles in 
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from response to the Green Paper, these documents included, position papers, 
briefing papers etc that were sent to the EC. 
Mr. Pflugrath added that IFAC had limited communication to EC, such as, response 
to the Green Paper and some press releases, because IFAC has it regional 
organization FEE which does the communication to EC on regional level. Mr. 
Cooper also commented that when the deadline for amendments comes closer "the 
parliament got bombarded by the position papers, briefing papers etc”.  
 Communication with MEPs and national representatives in 
EU 
Secondly, it has also been found that the professional organizations requested and 
had direct communication with the MEPs and representatives in the EC. For 
instance Ms. Robert said that FEE "requested for the meetings with MEPs and their 
assistants to discuss the relevant articles of the regulation". Ms. Agélii added that 
FAR had regular contact with Swedish representatives in EP and EC, by way of 
meetings, phone contacts, emails and round tables in Brussels, to discuss different 
drafts of the reform. Mr. Cooper also supported this point by saying that "the 
parliament got bombarded by request for meeting with MEPs, with all sorts of 
proposals". He also pointed out that the MEPs are not directly approachable for 
meetings, but the assistants are. This provides an example for under the radar 
lobbying, as an identified by Mr.Cooper. He said that “The methods frequently 
used by the lobbyist are to take assistants to lunch and drinks that I feel is pretty 
dodgy at time and  is an unspoken scandal in the Brussels parliament that the 
assistants might be very close to the lobbyists” (see Figure 5). 
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Figure 5 Communication with MEPs and national representatives in EU 
 Stakeholder engagements  
Thirdly, evidences of stakeholder engagement have also been found. For instance, 
Mr. Pflugrath commented that "When IFAC was developing its response to the GP 
and press release it consulted with the Forum of firms (FOF) that represent audit 
firms; with small and medium practices committee to get the views of smaller 
practices; accountants in business (CEO) and FEE. In addition, Ms. Agélii 
mentioned that in the process FAR had "regular contacts with Swedish Justice 
Ministry, Swedish Enterprise the members (Big 6 audit firm) and CEOs of the 
listed companies. In the context of similar views shared by the members of 
accounting profession regarding the reform, Ms Robert commented that "Big four 
firms are part of the accountancy profession, which represents FEE membership. 
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This is the reason why we are a bit talking about the same people". Ms Robert 
added that "FEE represents the whole profession though, and not big four firms 
only, we also include the views of smaller firms and small practitioners. This is the 
reason why FEE has a more balanced and consensual approach". (see Figure 6). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6 Stakeholder engagements 
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 Reliance for technical knowledge 
Fourthly, evidences were also found on the matter that regulators meet and rely on 
professionals for technical knowledge, to regulate the profession. In this regard, 
both Ms. Robert and Mr. Cooper said that MEPs and their assistants contact and 
rely on the members of the profession for technical knowledge, to take a position in 
the parliament. Mr. Cooper further mentioned that while providing the technical 
knowledge "the profession pushes it particular views".  
 Propagation of ideology of audit firms from institution to 
institution 
Lastly, the matter of political pressure and lobbying to influence the MEPs got 
confirmed by Mr. Cooper and he said "the power the Big Four have and the 
approaches they can take should not be understated, as the Big Four has huge 
amount of money and huge amount of power". The immense power possession of 
the audit firms is attributed to the propagation of ideology of members of the audit 
firms from institution to institution. To this Mr. Cooper commented that "the 
process of the reform has been subjected to a regulatory capture as the main 
standard setting bodies like IAASB, IFRIC, some of the regulatory bodies are 
either started by and/or employ former Big Four members". Moreover he said that 
it appears that "the employees of these bodies are working for Big Four, they are all 
friends and know each other" and "these people carry with them their own views, 
their contacts, and their conceptions about what audit should be for". On the matter 
of regulatory capture Mr. Cooper added that "the situation now is that the 
regulators across board are captured but the Big Four are so huge that no one talks 
about them" (see Figure 7). 
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Figure 7 Propagation of ideology of audit firms from institution to institution 
5.3 Lobbying details from Transparency Register 
Looking into the Transparency Register helped the authors to figure out who from 
the accounting profession were engaged in the process of lobbying the EU audit 
legislation. It was found that except for IFAC, all the other firms and professional 
bodies discussed in this thesis were registered for lobbying in the transparency 
register (Europa, 2015a). Being registered in the register FEE does not only 
comment on EU matters but also advise and comment global standard setting and 
policymaking in the diversified field of accounting, auditing and other professional 
matter. In addition FEE was also active in presenting the accounting profession 
interest, related to the EU audit reform, as mentioned in the Transparency Register. 
(Europa, 2015b). Although, the Transparency Register shows the involvement of 
FAR in the lobbying process against the reform, however, the details on the matter 
are not disclosed (Europa, 2015e). For PwC the register shows that, in recent years, 
the interest representational activities of PwC have largely focused on aspects of 
EU audit legislation and its implementation across the 28 EU member states. Our 
principal concern was and is to ensure that the legislation would help enhance the 
quality of audits for capital markets both in the Europe and globally (Europa, 
2015c).  
 
For KPMG the register indicate that its activities in the course of lobbying on the 
reform including organizing periodic events to share information and its views on 
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the affair and regular publishing of information brochures and articles (Europa, 
2015k). The activities of Deloitte covered in the Transparency Register include 
Social Progress Imperative breakfast or lunch meetings at the EP (Europa, 2015l). 
The activities covered in the register relating to E&Y are limited and only disclose 
that their principal concern was to ensure that through the audit directive the quality 
of the audit will enhance both in EU and in the world (Europa, 2015d). The 
lobbying activities of Grant Thornton relate to the implementation phase of the 
reform (Europa, 2015g), therefore, out of the scope of this thesis. The involvement 
of BDO in the process of influencing the audit reform was also limited, as the 
register discloses that the "Regulatory Contact Partners from the BDO offices 
across Europe might occasionally (less than 10%) be involved in BDO interest 
representation to the European Commission and the European Parliament" (Europa, 
2015f, pg.1).  
 
The involvement of ECG in the lobbying process on the reform was also limited in 
disclosure. However, ECG's concern was in line with that of the audit firms, that 
was ensuring enhancement of audit quality through the adoption of the directive 
(Europa, 2015). In contrast, according to the register EGIAN was more vocal and 
showed active involvement by attendance and/or speaking in events in the 
Parliament and elsewhere to discuss the choice and harmonization of the many 
member state options provided for in the legislation and to explain our members 
views. Moreover, the Register also discloses the budget allocated by EGIAN to 
these activities. Where the amount allocated excluded the costs of "contributed" 
time spent by senior staff from EGIAN members in relation to EGIAN activities. 
These activities are principally meeting key counterparts (such as, The EC, The EP, 
CESR, and national regulatory authorities), responding to the Commission 
consultations (Europa, 2015). 
61 
 
6 Analysis and Discussion  
This chapter presents two important components of this thesis the analysis of the 
findings and the discussion. Section 6.1-6.8 presents the analysis of the finding and 
it is divided into various subsections that explain the lobbying targeted at different 
events taking place in EU institutions. Section 6.1 relates to lobbying in EC, where, 
6.1.1 describes the methods of lobbying. Section 6.2 relates to motives, where, 
details of motives behind the lobbying of accounting profession are presented in 
relevant headings. Section 6.3 describes how EP was lobbied and subsections 6.3.1 
and 6.3.2 presents the methods and motives behind lobbying the EP, respectively. 
In section 6.3.2, due to the repetition of motive of lobbying from EC, the motives 
are not explained under the headings. Sections 6.4, 6.5 and 6.6 present the methods 
and motives of lobbying being explained together, due to their repetition from the 
lobbying of EC and EP. These sections relate to lobbying the Council of Ministers, 
“Trialogue” and the EP before the final voting, respectively. Section 6.7 explains 
the method of lobbying that does not relate to any specific EU institution or event; 
rather exist during the whole legislative procedure. Section 6.8 provides the 
summing up of the methods used and motives behind the lobbying on the EU audit 
reform. The last section, Section 6.9 puts forwards the discussion on the topic of 
new EU audit reform and presents the contribution of this research to the literature. 
6.1  Lobbying the European Commission  
6.1.1 Methods 
In 2010 the EC issued the GP and the profession was invited to respond to the GP. 
The responses were sent by each member of the profession discussed in this thesis 
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except ECG, where the profession expressed their views, concerns and suggestions 
to the reform. In the response to the GP these members of the profession shared 
their strong opposition and negative remarks on the measures of MFR and 
Prohibition of NAS. The stance and wordings of mid-tier firms i.e. BDO and Grant 
Thornton, in opposing these measures appear mild, as they state that they do not 
believe the audit firm tenure should be limited and the provision of NAS should not 
be prohibited. In light of the findings of Königsgruber (2009) and Georgiou (2004) 
the comment letters are used as a tool to lobby. In relation to this, issuance of 
responses to the GP indicates the initiation of lobbying process by the members of 
the accounting profession, to influence the EC in drafting its legislation. However, 
responding to the GP is also considered to be a normal practice, as the EC needs to 
know the opinions and address the concerns of the stakeholders, so as to ensure 
smooth acceptance of the regulation in all the constituencies.  
In the course of drafting the response to the GP, it has also been found that 
professional bodies were engaged in consultation with various stakeholders, for 
instance, in November 2010 FAR delivered its opinions to the Justice Ministry of 
Sweden, so that the Ministry could base their response to GP including the opinion 
of FAR. This indicates that FAR might have promoted its concerns through 
Swedish governmental institution. Moreover, in interview with FAR it was 
discovered that they had regular contacts with Swedish Enterprise; CEOs of listed 
companies, to inform them about the reform; large audit firms including BDO and 
Grant Thornton. It might be viewed as FAR's attempt to influence the opinions of 
these stakeholders, in relation to the proposal made in the GP. At the stage of 
drafting response to the GP, IFAC engaged consultation with FOF and small and 
medium practices, to take into consideration opinions of large, mid-tier and small 
practitioners. Additionally, IFAC also consulted accountants in business. The 
consultation process between the professional organizations and interested parties 
point towards the exercise of collective power by the profession as identified by 
Larson (1977) and Johnson (1972), to promote the interest of accounting profession 
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as a whole. Through this characteristic it can be drawn that members of profession 
wanted to form a collective opinion, which could prove to be more powerful and 
influential on the EC at the stage drafting the regulation, than their individual 
opinions. This might be seen as an effective way of influencing the EC, as it needs 
expert knowledge for legislative work (EP, 2003).  
In relation to the aspect of collective power being exercised by the profession, it 
has also been found that the elites of accountancy profession create groups (Larson 
(1977) and Johnson (1972)), with the aim to promoting their collective interest, for 
instance, ECG and EGIAN. This finding has been supported by the discussion in 
the study of Humphrey et al., (2009) that accounting professional associations 
exist. The reason for their existence is presented by Samsonova-Taddei & 
Humphery (2015), those associations, such as, ECG represents the accountancy 
firms and in their dealing with European governance institutions, particularly the 
EC and the EP. This organization was classified a rare case of cooperation between 
the large accounting firms on a transnational policy stage (Kelly, 1996 seen in 
Samsonova-Taddei & Humphrey, 2015). Through EGIAN audit firms promoted 
their views to influence the EC, as EGIAN response to the GP was representative 
of the views of mid-tier audit firms. However ECG's response to the GP was not 
found due to lack of transparency in the activity and operations of the organization. 
ECG was found classified as in-house lobbyist according to Transparency Register; 
therefore, it can be assumed that ECG used some unofficial methods of lobbying to 
influence the EC. 
6.2 Motives 
6.2.1 Achievement of objectives 
The concerns of the profession on the three measures in the GP were based on the 
argument that the reform will not achieve its objectives. For instance, the 
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profession argued during whole of the legislative process, that as a result of the 
regulation the quality of audit will not increase, rather it will decrease (IFAC, 2010; 
FEE, 2010 and FAR, 2010). It might be the case, based on the reason presented by 
FEE, that due to MFR the auditors will lose valuable knowledge of the client and in 
the first year the auditors will not have enough knowledge of the clients business, 
thus, the quality of audit in initial years will get adversely affected and 
consequently more financial failures might occur.  
 
In addition, MFR will result in constant disruption of operations of audit firms after 
a fixed interval. However, the profession does not put forward the effects that MFR 
can have on the business of the audit firms. That is, MFR might lead to strong 
negative consequences for the audit firms commercially. For instance, frequent loss 
of long-standing audit clients, which can have negative effects on revenue stream, 
as due to the restriction the firms might not be able to audit their previous clients, 
thereby, the number of clients might reduce. The profession claims that due to lack 
of knowledge of the client's business in the initial years the quality of audit might 
not be the same. This argument only highlights damage caused to public interest as 
a result of MFR. However, motive of profession to promote the self-interest of 
accounting firms as identified by Larson (1977) is not revealed. It can be explained 
as the hidden interest of the accounting firms, which refers to damage caused to 
audit firm's reputation as a result of low quality of audit in the initial years. This 
can lead to further loss of audit clients and revenue earned from them.  
 
The profession also argued that there are no studies or evidence that supports MFR 
to increase audit quality. To support this point IFAC's shared its opinion in the 
interview, that there was no sufficient time to investigate the effectiveness and 
contribution of even partner rotation and on MFR the research shows a mixed 
result. This argument is understandable, as it is more convincing to have supporting 
evidence for such a measure. Nonetheless, the MFR study in Italy, referred in most 
of the responses to GP, show that no significant difference in audit quality has been 
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found as a result of MFR (Cameran M., Prencipe A. & Trombetta M. (n.d.). Based 
on these studies, the suspicion put forward by the profession with respect to MFR 
being able to increase audit quality appears justifiable.  
 
For prohibition of NAS, the profession argues that the reliance on the work of 
external experts will increase, whose work might not be consistent with the 
practices of the accounting firm and, thus, the quality of such work could not be 
assured. Therefore, usage of the work of external experts might negatively affect 
the quality of audit (KPMG, 2010). Further, they argue that provision of NAS can 
improve the knowledge of the business (KPMG, 2010), that can ultimately lead to 
high quality of audit performed. It might be true, as it is difficult to assure the 
quality of work performed by third party and also that provision of NAS can 
improve the overall understanding of the client's business. However, apart from the 
audit quality, the concerns of the profession might also relate to the proposal of 
'pure-audit' firms made in the GP. The strong opposition can be viewed as 
accounting firms’ struggle to maintain control on its jurisdiction. Abbott (1988) 
defines jurisdiction as a right to control provision of particular services. In this case 
the jurisdictional claim refers to the provision of NAS and its prohibition is directly 
related to the contraction of the jurisdictional claims of the accounting firms. In line 
with the description of Larson (1977) and Johnson (1972) the profession's concern 
on contraction of its jurisdiction can be associated with the self-interest of audit 
firms. As this will adversely affect their economics because they will lose a 
significant proportion of the fees received from it.  
 
Secondly, the measures proposed in the reform came under criticism by the 
profession as they believe that another stated objective of the reform i.e. to increase 
auditor's independence will not be achieved. In relation to MFR, the profession 
presents the argument that there is no evidence that supports the effectiveness of 
MFR to enhance auditor's independence. However, from authors' perspective it can 
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be argued that the objective of MFR is to reduce the possibility of having 
longstanding clients, good relationship with whom can hamper the objectivity and 
professional skepticism of the auditor. MFR appears to be an effective way to 
address the threat of over familiarity between the audit firm and its client, thereby, 
in reality independence can increase. The profession further argues that there is no 
need for MFR as the requirement for mandatory partner rotation in 7 years already 
exist in 8th audit directive 2006. The support of profession to partner rotation 
instead of MFR, might be associated with the covert self-interest (Larson, 1977 and 
Johnson, 1972) of the audit firms. As it highlights the fact that the former will not 
result in losing firm's long standing clients and the revenues earned from them. 
Whereas, the latter might shake the comfortable long term associations between the 
firms and their clients and the revenue stream of the audit firms.  
 
For the objective of increase in auditor independence, the profession recommended 
the adoption of the Code of Ethics for the list of Prohibited NAS, rather than a 
black list introduced in the reform. However, it can also be argued in line with the 
statement of Mr. Cooper that "audit is not a very profitable part of the business 
anymore and that is why there is a big growth in NAS" that due to the decreasing 
profitability of audit services, the reliance and dependence of auditors on provision 
of NAS might increase. Thus, the auditor's might compromise their independence, 
or might not perform audit objectively, as they will be more interested in providing 
NAS, based on its economic value. This represents the shift in economically 
desirable work focus (Reiter & Williams, n.d.). In addition, as explained by Abbott 
(1988) the economic interest is at the core of any professional project and when the 
economic value to non-core services (NAS) outweighed the economic value of core 
activities (audit), it might become difficult for auditors to perform audit 
independently.  
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Thirdly, out of the most highlighted reasons of the financial crisis is the high 
market concentration of few large firms in the audit market. This has enabled the 
large audit firms to capture a huge market share and thereby dominate the market. 
The market domination in turn enables these firms to set the rules for themselves. 
Through MFR, EC aimed to encourage more competition in the market, to dilute 
the market concentration and dominance of the large audit firms. However, the 
profession collectively presented the argument that in light of the study conducted 
in Italy, MFR will have counter effect, as it will lead to greater market 
concentration. In contrast to profession's argument that MFR will increase market 
concentration, this can also be argued that as a result of MFR all the firms will need 
to change their clients after a fixed interval. Thus, if the firm will lose one client, it 
will also gain one as a result of other audit firms rotation. This appears to be no 
gain no loss or a zero sum game. From profession's arguments it appears that the 
consequences MFR might turn out to be against the public interest. However, 
according to characteristics of the profession discussed by Larson (1977) and 
Johnson (1972) the profession seeks to monopolies the industry for its services and 
seeks to control and dominate the market. In the case MFR, the underlying motive 
of the large audit firms might be to protect their already existing oligopolistic 
status, by aiming to restrict the numbers of practitioners, to maintain their 
exclusivity that helps in sustaining fee levels and social standing. The objective of 
the MFR is to reduce market concentration, by encouraging more competition in 
the market. However, this can jeopardize the position and control of the market by 
large audit firms.  
6.2.2 Difficult to implement in practice 
Against the MFR, the profession argued that it will be very difficult to implement 
in practice. As the large audit firms have huge multinational clients, it has been 
argued that as a result of MFR, a multinational company would either have to 
change audit firms on a global basis every time rotation is required in any given 
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jurisdiction, or to use a variety of different audit firms in those jurisdictions that 
require rotation, which is very expensive, inefficient and impractical (Deloitte, 
2010, p.13-14). Keeping in view the interest of the clients, this argument appear 
appropriate, as multinational companies operate all around the globe abiding to 
audit firm rotation rules of every jurisdiction might substantially add to their cost 
and administrative work. Moreover, the multinational companies will not receive 
consistent quality of audit across their worldwide operations. In addition, this can 
also be argued that as a result of changing audit clients in some jurisdictions more 
frequently than the others, might affect the overall quality of audit service provided 
to a multinational company, as the auditor might have to lose and thus not have 
enough knowledge of some subsidiaries of group. However, gaining knowledge of 
the overall group in this situation to provide consistent quality of audit, might 
substantially add to the cost and administrative workload of the auditors as well. As 
a result the commercial interest of the firm might get adversely affected. The 
motive behind the argument might be to protect the self-interest (Larson, 1977 and 
Johnson, 1972) of accounting firms.  
6.2.3 Cost and Administrative Burden 
The concerns of the profession related to MFR was not surprisingly also related to 
the resulting cost considerations and increase in the work burden, for both its client 
and itself. For MFR, the profession argues that due to the reform the clients 
businesses will also get indirectly affected, as continuously changing auditors after 
a fixed interval can significantly add to the internal cost and administrative burden 
for the clients. This has been argued in the context that both management of the 
client and auditors will be required to allocate more time and resources in helping 
the new auditors in developing the required knowledge and understanding of the 
client's business (FEE, 2010). The risk to self-interest of the auditors and clients 
can directly be linked to increased allocation of time and resources, as it will 
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impose extra cost for both parties. Consequently, the profitability of the auditors 
and the clients might get negatively affected.   
6.2.4 Unclear definition of NAS 
In relation to NAS, the profession shares its concern that in the regulation the 
definition of NAS in the GP is not clear and that it should be defined more clearly 
(Deloitte, 2010). The authors share the concern of the profession to some extent i.e. 
on the issue that the regulation allows the provision of NAS if they are immaterial. 
However, the basis of materiality is not explicitly mentioned or defined in the 
regulation. On the other hand, Deloitte's argument that the definition of NAS is not 
clear might indicate its aim to control the definition of its jurisdiction, identified by 
Abbott (1988) as a characteristic of the profession. Jurisdiction can be explained as 
variety of services that the profession can provide. In this case, it can be explained 
as the accounting firm's effort to self define and thereby, control the services it 
claims its jurisdiction on.   
6.2.5 Reduce audit firm's ability to attract talent 
In opposition to creation of pure audit firms and prohibition of NAS, the profession 
presented the argument that because of these two measures the audit firms will not 
be able to attract and hire high quality specialist staff, whose services are required 
at the time when auditors undertake complex audits which requires specialist 
services (KPMG, 2010; Ernst & Young, 2010; FAR, 2010). Therefore, audit firms 
require competent multi-disciplinary team. Inability to hire and retain such staff 
will make audit firms dependent on third party for the specialist services for which 
the quality of the work cannot be assured. This can in turn negatively affect the 
quality of the audit performed. However, underlying this argument, there can be 
profession's motive to protect and control the market for its expertise Abbott 
(1988).  By Protecting and controlling the market for required expert skills, will 
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enable audit firms to expand their infrastructure by provide those services, which 
can significantly add to their revenue. In addition, it will also facilitate the client to 
take different services from one service provider (accounting firm).  
6.2.6 Commercial interest of profession  
Not surprisingly, the accounting firms appeared vocal about it commercial 
considerations, they presented the argument that prohibition of NAS will weaken 
the general economics of audit firm (Deloitte, 2010). In addition, it also argued that 
creation of pure audit firms will undermine the financial strength of the audit firms 
and will restrict the firm's opportunity to extend its infrastructure (Grant Thornton, 
2010). Therefore, the business model of an audit only firm would be unsustainable. 
The firms' argument appears in line with the discussion presented by Reiter & 
William (2012) that economic value is at the core of any professional project, as 
identified by Abbott (1988). This signifies that due to Prohibition of NAS the 
accounting firms might lose a significant portion of the economic value earned 
from it.  
6.3 Lobbying JURI Committee of EP 
6.3.1 Methods 
 In the period between 30-November-2011 when the EC issued the draft legislation 
and 25-April-2013 when vote in JURI Committee was conducted, various 
documents were published by the members of the profession, as identified in the 
finding, to voice their opinion about the controversial articles of the reform. In 
addition, to discuss the negative consequences of the implementation of these 
articles for the audit market, clients and various stakeholders. This finding was 
supported by Mr. Cooper's comment that "the parliament got bombarded by the 
position papers, briefing papers etc”. These documents put forward the initial views 
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of the accounting profession on the reform and expressed deep concerns regarding 
the three articles in question with the EP and various stakeholders.  These 
documents are classified as the comment letters and described as a tool to lobby by 
(Königsgruber (2009) and Georgiou (2004).  
 
In issuing its press release to the draft legislation, IFAC consulted FOF; Small and 
Medium Practices Committee; Accountants in Business and FEE; FAR had regular 
consultation with its stakeholders. At this stage, other methods used by the 
accounting profession to influence the regulators include direct communication and 
meetings with MEPs and national representatives in the EU, for instance, Sweden. 
The meetings with national representatives in the EU was discovered in the 
interview with FAR, where the ways of  communication to promote the viewpoints 
of Swedish accounting profession included, e-mails, phone calls, meetings and 
round tables. The evidence of meetings between members of the profession and 
MEPs was gathered from the transparency register, for instance in case with 
Deloitte (Europa, 2015l). This finding was supported by the comments made by 
FEE and Mr. Cooper in the interview. In addition, Mr. Cooper also commented that 
it is easier to access the assistants of MEPs, rather than the MEPs themselves. 
Apart from submission of comment letters Georgiou (2004) identified private 
meetings between the members of the profession and the regulators as a means of 
lobbying. In addition, it was discussed by Sikka and Willmott (1995) that 
Profession mobilizes other agencies, for instance, politicians, academics, regulators 
and clients to promote their interest and protect their jurisdiction.  
 
In the interviews with FEE and Mr. Cooper it has been discovered that it is not only 
the profession that reach out to MEPs to promote their interest, the MEPs also 
contact and rely on members of the profession for technical knowledge in the 
relevant area, to take a position in the Parliament. However, in the interview with 
FEE it was identified that the meetings between members of the profession and 
MEPs are confidential and no traces of it can be found. The suspicion of the 
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authors to look into the minutes of these meetings got addressed by Mr. Cooper, 
when he commented that in providing the technical knowledge to regulators, “the 
profession does push its particular point of view”. The control of the accounting 
profession over its tacit knowledge, serve it as a major source of power. This 
exemplifies that the knowledge monopolies created by the profession allows it to 
control its regulatory environment, as discussed by Freidson (1970). The specialist 
knowledge of the profession is used as a tool to convey its particular interests to the 
regulators. 
 
The lobbying activities targeted to the Council were not found to be transparent, 
thus, no evidence for it could be collected. It is argued that lobbying in the Council 
rarely takes place as it is difficult for the lobbyist to access the ministers and the 
high-level setup fragmentation (Peterson & Shackleton, 2006).  
6.3.2 Motives  
In this phase the arguments presented by the accounting profession, such as, the 
reform will not achieve its objective: it will decrease the audit quality, decrease 
independence, increase market concentration and motive of lobbying against MFR 
and prohibition of NAS did not change significantly. The introduction of 10% fee 
cap on NAS got strongly negative remarks by the profession. EGIAN (2012) 
argued that the cap appear unrealistic and might pose a threat to the auditor's 
independence. The opposition to limitation of fee can be explained as profession's 
effort to maintaining its level of fee, according to Larson (1977) and Johnson 
(1972). It appears justifiable that the cap or limitation on the fee earned from NAS 
is meant to reduce the economic dependence of auditors on NAS and thereby 
ensuring independence. Limiting the fee cap from NAS to 10% will certainly and 
significantly reduce the revenue received by the audit firms from it; thereby it 
might not remain financially viable for firms to provide these services. This might 
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measure might increase the independence of the firms, but will simultaneously 
limit their jurisdiction as well.  
 
Profession's argument of difficulty to implement in practice in relation to MFR and 
Prohibition of NAS extended to as the fee cap on NAS was introduced. In the a 
debate article FAR (2011) negative reaction was based on the argument that it will 
be impossible to reconcile any such cap with the proposed blacklist approach. 
Apart from difficulty in implementing and practicing such a cap, it can also be 
argued that it can certainly and severely limit the fee received by the firm as a 
result of providing these related financial services. Thereby, such a cap will be 
contrary to profession's struggle to maintain its fee level. In addition, as found in 
the interview with FAR, implementation and reconciliation of such a cap can 
substantially add to the administrative burden and the compliance cost of the audit 
firms. In addition, to the arguments against MFR in the responses to the GP, 
Deloitte (2012) puts forward a new argument that the auditors will also be required 
to continually educate themselves about the environment and the risks of the new 
businesses. The cost for the audit firms will include the monetary cost of educating 
its members, as well as, opportunity cost of  extra time and resources allocation, in 
order to develop the understanding of the new client and thereby, selling less of 
their services. The extra cost incurred and the revenue lost might weaken the 
economic position of the audit firms. As it will directly affect their profitability, 
thereby, bringing the self-interest (Larson (1977) and Johnson (1972)) of the audit 
firms at risk.  
 
The negative response of FEE (2011c) to the capping of fees of NAS is argued to 
be the negative effect on the quality of NAS. As such a low fee will not justify the 
resource allocation. However, with respect to Larson (1977) and Johnson (1972) it 
can also be argued that the opposition might be in the vague of profession's struggle 
to maintain it level of fee. 
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The strong criticism on the measures of MFR and prohibition of NAS appeared to 
enlarge to a bigger scale, when FEE's president presented the argument that these 
measures it will isolate Europe on the world stage, in his speech in the EP. This has 
been argued in the context that both of the measures will increase administrative 
burden and reduce expertise and knowledge within the audit firm. In addition, it has 
also put forward that in respect of prohibition of NAS the inconsistency between 
the rules outside the EU and within the EU will add to the complexity of doing 
business in Europe. Therefore, implementing these measures through the regulation 
will put Europe to competitive disadvantage (PwC, 2011b). However, from the 
author's perspective it can be argued that it will be the European audit market that 
will be at competitive disadvantage, as accounting firms being the direct recipient 
of the regulation, will be affected much more compared any other business 
operating in the Europe. In line with this argument, the interest of the profession 
also becomes highlighted, as identified by Larson (1977) and Johnson (1972). The 
self-interest aspect refers to the substantial increase in the cost and complexity for 
the European audit firms, as they will have to allocate more resources to review the 
work performed by auditors and other service providers to the counterparts of their 
clients operating in different regions of the world. 
 
The issue of reduction in accounting firm's ability to attract high quality talent was 
raised again in the speech made by the president of FEE in the EP. The argument 
was not different from what was said by KPMG, E&Y and FAR in their responses 
to GP, therefore, the motive behind the argument remains the same, as discussed 
above.  
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6.4 Lobbying the Council of Ministers  
Due to the lack of transparency in the activities of European council, the 
accounting profession's motives behind and the methods used to lobby the council 
are not found. However, as mentioned in the findings in May 2013 a debate took 
place in the Council, where compromised amendments with regard to three much 
debated topics were proposed: the prohibition of NAS, MFR and capping of fee of 
NAS (FEE, 2013b). It was noted by FEE that the council strongly supported the 
"black list" approach to prohibition of NAS but different the Member States did not 
agree on the extensive list of the prohibition, the principle of capping the fee 
received from NAS and the principle, duration and scope of MFR. As established 
earlier that the activities of council are much more opaque than that of the EP, 
therefore the amendments proposed by the Council are unknown. 
6.5 Lobbying EC, EP and the Council before the 
“Trialogue”  
On the matter of prohibition of NAS, FEE appeared in line with amendments 
proposed by the JURI Committee (FEE, 2013b). However, FEE and PwC (2013e) 
did not appear convinced with the measure of MFR, even when the firm rotation 
period extended to 14 years, as they argued that very limited studies exist to 
support such a measure. In addition, the PwC welcomed the suggestion of complete 
deletion of fee cap by JURI and supported it with the argument that independence 
should not depend on any arbitrary monetary amount. However, it still expressed 
its concerns that MFR could be counterproductive to audit quality, implementation 
of Prohibition of NAS and fee cap will be very difficult. On the matter of MFR, 
E&Y shared the same concern as FEE and PwC that even after 14 years, MFR will 
be harmful to audit quality and it will take way from the role of audit committee. 
The arguments of PwC, FEE and E&Y appeared to promote the amendments of the 
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JURI Committee to the final legislation and simultaneously stressed upon the 
counter productivity of the initial draft legislation.  
Apart from MFR, the amendments proposed by the JURI appeared in line with the 
suggestions made by the profession in its responses to the GP and various 
documents issued by the profession between of issuance of draft legislation and 
voting in JURI. The adoption of Code of Ethics instead of the black list of NAS, 
will allows the accounting firms' to maintain their jurisdiction, at least to some 
extent. This proposal appeared in line with the suggestion made by the profession 
and received its support. Further, it appears in line with Freidson (1970) that 
professions aims to protect its professional autonomy, as Code of Ethics is principle 
based and allow more options than the strict regulation proposed. For instance, 
Code of Ethics allows provision of NAS if appropriate safeguards are in place to 
avoid any threat to auditor's independence, whereas, the proposal by EC does not 
allow for it. Moreover, deletion of fees cap on NAS, coincides with audit firm's 
effort to protect its self-interest (Larson (1977), Johnson (1972)), as the deletion 
will eliminate the possibility of reduction of revenue received by the audit firms, as 
a result of such a cap. Therefore, the support of audit firms' these amendment 
proposed by JURI are understandable. 
FEE issued a press release after the debate in the Council, where they opposed the 
amendments proposed by the Council (FEE, 2013a). FEE stressed upon the same 
arguments, for instance, MFR will decrease audit quality and increase market 
concentration. Further, it stressed upon its support to adoption of the Code of 
Ethics. The press release issued by FEE was meant emphasize the fact that the 
profession is not satisfied by the amendments proposed by the Council. Moreover, 
FEE (2013c) issued a letter to the EC, EP and the Council, and repeated its 
arguments that MFR will increase financial cost, prohibition of NAS will decrease 
independence and fee cap on NAS will be difficult to reconcile. Furthermore, the 
argument of difficulty in implementation and practice was raised by FEE, in the 
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context of various options available to EU member states. They argue that these 
options can dangerously fragment the internal market (FEE, 2013c). From the 
authors' perspective this is a valid argument, as various options available to the 
Member States will lead to patchwork in the final legislation. Thereby, it makes it 
difficult to evaluate the effectiveness of the Regulation against its stated objectives. 
Apart from the issuance of formal documents the profession also engaged in 
meeting with politicians. For instance, FAR was in regular contact with Swedish 
representatives in EP and EC and FEE had meetings with MEP. This can be 
exemplified as mobilization of agencies to promote profession's interest, as 
discussed by Sikka & Willmot (1995). The motive behind the meetings between the 
members of professional organizations and the politicians did not change, however, 
the probability of promoting profession's interest and view increased, as JURI 
Committee's amendments proposal fall in line with the suggestions of the 
profession. 
6.6 Lobbying the Parliament before final voting 
Lack of adoption of amendments proposed by the JURI Committee and finalization 
of substantially strict reforms in the final legislation, after the compromise reached 
between the EP, EC and the Member States in the 'Trialogue', lead to sheer 
disappointment in the accounting profession. For instance, FEE (2013d) shared its 
disappointment on the fact that the regulation did not incorporate the adoption of 
the Code of Ethics. The disappointment was substantiated through the arguments 
that the final version, mentioned in findings, will lead to considerable increase in 
the cost and the complexity for the businesses. Through the arguments of the 
profession at this final stage, it appeared as if their concerns and opposition in 
relation to the three measures has resumed. The accounting profession was falling 
back to the arguments it presented against the draft legislation initially. Before final 
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voting in February 2014, FEE sent a letter to EC, regarding clarifications needed to 
help member states to implement the legislation in a consistent way. However, the 
timing of the letter sent and its content regarding the three articles, gives an 
impression that it was FEE's last effort to influence the final voting on the 
legislation, through European Commissioner Michel Barnier. 
In April 2014, final voting on the EU audit reform took place and the amendments 
finalized in the “Trialogue” got incorporated in the Regulation. At this stage, 
various members of the profession, for instance, FEE and audit firms expressed 
their deep concerns about the effectiveness of the MFR and strict restriction on 
provision of NAS. However, these documents were meant to express profession's 
opinion on the final voting and to share their disappointment on the fact that their 
suggestions did not get incorporated in the final legislation. 
6.7 Methods of lobbying during the entire legislative 
procedure  
The network created by different members of the accounting profession, was also 
identified as one of the most effective method used by the profession to lobby. 
Commenting on the network of accounting profession Mr. Cooper said that it 
appears like "the employees of regulatory bodies are working for Big Four; they are 
all friends and know each other". He added that "Regulatory bodies, such as, 
IAASB and EFRAG are either started by and/or employ former Big Four 
members". In addition, it is discussed in Humphery & Loft (2011. p 6) that large 
firms have also been involved in supporting IFAC financially, and they were 
allocated seats on each of IFAC's standard-setting boards. These examples signify 
that the ideology and interest of the Big Four accounting firms have been 
propagated to other related bodies and organizations through cross membership on 
the boards of the firms and the organization and the movement of their employees 
within the network. The strong networking between the accountancy firms, the 
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professional associations and organizations can be seen as their attempt to increase 
their power of influence on the regulators. The spread of ideology gets 
substantiated through movement of members from one institution to another in the 
network. This might put the opinions of all the members of the network in line and 
be expressed collectively. The collectivity provides strength to the voice of the 
network and helps in pressurizing the regulators, in the favor of the network of the 
accounting profession.  However, the aspect of propagation of ideology in the 
network of the profession and aggressive lobbying through threatening MEPs are 
not explained in the Theory of Profession. 
Additionally, during the study of various professional journals and news in the 
media, it was found that other than the methods described above the accounting 
profession also engaged into some intense lobbying. For instance, threatening the 
MEPs. In this context Mr. Cooper commented that "the big four has huge amount 
of money and huge amount power". He added that "the power of the Big Four and 
the approaches they can take should not be understated". However, this type of 
intense and aggressive lobbying is not accounted for or explained by the theory of 
profession. 
6.8 Summing up 
To sum up the discussion above, it can be said that all the three institutions of the 
EU confronted the lobbying activities of the accounting profession, as a result of 
the introduction of the new EU audit reform.  It was found that lobbying targeted to 
EC and EP was far more intense than the Council, due to the fact that the Council 
ministers are difficult to reach by the lobbyists (Peterson & Shackleton, 2006). In 
addition, activities of the Council are also opaque in relation to that of the EC and 
the EP, which makes it even more difficult for the lobbyists to influence them. The 
lobbying of accounting profession to the EC initiated by sending responses to the 
GP, which are classified by Königsgruber (2009) and Georgiou (2004) as a tool to 
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lobby. Another method of lobbying at this stage included mobilizing different 
agencies, such as, the Justice ministry of Sweden, CEOs of listed companies and 
accounting firms. Moreover, profession also engaged in exercising it collective 
power, through its associations, such as, ECG and EGIAN. Apart from putting 
forward the public interest in the arguments presented, it has been found that the 
audit firms' were struggling to promote their self-interest; protecting and 
maintaining its jurisdiction; protecting its oligopolistic status; sustain its fee level; 
control the market for its expertise; maintaining self-regulation and the commercial 
interest of the accounting firms. 
The lobbying faced by the EP was also targeted to its JURI committee. The method 
of lobbying the Parliament was to send huge number of documents, including, 
briefing papers, policy statements and point of views etc. Professional 
organizations mobilized other agencies, such as MEPs and national (Swedish) 
representatives in the EU. Furthermore, methods of lobbying included, exercise of 
collective power by profession through its stakeholder engagements. The major 
source of power available to the profession to influence MEPs and the EU regulator 
was identified as the knowledge monopoly of the accounting profession. Drawing 
from the arguments presented by the profession, the motive behind the lobbying the 
Parliament was similar to that of the EC. About the lobbying activities faced by the 
third institution of EU i.e. the Council, sufficient evidence is not available. Other 
methods of lobbying that existed during the entire legislative procedure are 
propagation of ideology from institution to institution, aggressive lobbying through 
threatening of MEPs and exercise collective power through professional 
associations (see Figure 8).  
Figure 8 illustrates the key events that took place in the EU institutions, related to 
the legislative procedure of the new EU audit reform. The figure illustrates how the 
accounting profession changed its methods of lobbying, depending on the 
institution they were lobbying and this is shown by the box containing those 
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specific methods, pointing towards the institution. The top left side of the figure 
illustrates the methods of lobbying used by the profession, which does not relate to 
any specific key event or institution, rather it prevails during the entire legislative 
procedure. The lower left side of the figure presents the motive of the profession, 
drawn by using the theory of profession (as explained in section 3.4). The motives 
that the profession was aiming to attain also prevailed during the entire legislative 
procedure and did not change with any specific event or institution. The motives of 
the profession and the methods of lobbying that did not change during the 
legislative procedure are shown at the left side, with clear headings to reduce the 
complexity for the readers to get the overall view of the analysis. 
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Figure 8 Summary of analysis    
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The European 
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(April, 2014) 
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(December, 2013) 
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 To protect 
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 To sustain fee level 
 To control the 
market for 
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 Commercial 
interest of the 
accounting firms 
 To control the 
definition of  its 
jurisdiction 
 
Methods: 
 Responses to Green Paper 
 Exercise of collective power by 
profession through stakeholder 
engagements 
 Influence using knowledge monopoly   
 
Methods: 
 Official publications 
(comment letters etc) 
 
Methods: 
 Influence using knowledge monopoly   
 Exercise of collective power by profession through 
stakeholder engagements 
 
Methods: 
 Official publications (comment 
letters etc) 
 Mobilization of agencies, such 
as, MEPs and national (Swedish) 
representatives in EU. 
 
Methods of lobbying during entire legislative procedure: 
 Threatening MEPs  
 Propagation of ideology from institution to 
institution 
 Exercise collective power through professional 
associations 
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6.9 Discussion 
The new audit reform represents the shift in the regulatory paradigm in EU. It was 
as a result of the change of the Commissioner for Internal Market and Services. 
Earlier it was McCreevy who was the Commissioner for Internal Market and 
Services (2004–2010). Being from Ireland, he followed a more principle based 
approach to regulate. Whereas, Barnier being a Frenchman, followed a strict rule-
based approach of regulation. Barnier's appointment from 2010-2014 as the Internal 
Market Commissioner, gave rise to substantial concerns that he may push French 
inspired restrictive regulation across Europe. The issuance of the GP for the new 
EU audit reform proved the concerns to be right, as the measures proposed were 
strictly rule-based, for instance, proposal for MFR, creation of audit-only firms and 
“black list” approach to prohibition of NAS. With these measures it seems as if 
Barnier aimed to impose strict state regulation in EU, similar to that of France. This 
point contrasts with the claims of Abbott (1988) and Friedson (2001) that state 
plays a secondary role in professionalization (Bianic, 2003). Bianic (2003) further 
discussed that to understand the relationship between state and profession not only 
national but international regulation should also be considered. However, in the 
case of the EU audit reform, the importance of regulation on a regional level, to 
understand the relationship between state and the profession was also found to be 
important by the authors. As with this regulation EU aim to regulate the accounting 
profession itself, rather than leaving it to the Member States through issuing 
another Directive only. 
It is not surprising that the sudden shift from principle-based to rule-based 
regulation proposed by EC under Barnier, triggered strong criticism and opposition 
from the accounting profession, as they were the direct recipients of the reform. 
The negative reaction of the profession leads to the act of lobbying, through the 
responses to the GP, in order to influence the reform. The arguments presented by 
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the profession appeared to focus the public interest, however, in depth analysis of 
the arguments make it evident that there were underlying motives of the accounting 
profession, especially the accounting firms, to influence the reform in their favor. 
As discussed above apart from responding to the GP, the profession employed 
various other methods of lobbying ranging from bombarding the EP with formal 
documents, meetings with MEPs, collective exercise of power through stakeholder 
engagement to threatening the MEPs. At the point of amendments proposed by the 
JURI, it appeared that the Parliament and the accounting profession are on the same 
line to some extent. In the debate in the Council, majority of the Member States 
shared their serious concerns on the measures in question. However, it appeared as 
if, the concerns of the profession and the Council and the amendments proposed by 
EP's JURI Committee were not wholly taken into consideration in the “Trialogue”. 
The incorporation of original measures proposed in the draft legislation with minor 
amendments, might indicate that the Commission under Barnier was more 
dominant in finalizing the legislation than the other two institutions of EU. 
 
Drawing from the analysis of the findings and the discussion above, this thesis 
contributes to the literature on lobbying by the accounting profession: 
 The unique institutional setting of EU provides multiple access points for 
the lobbying to be conducted; 
 Usage of the Theory of Profession developed an in-depth understanding of 
and identified a range of elaborated motives and methods of lobbying.  
Moreover, this study contributes to the Theory of Profession by identifying some 
methods of influence used by the profession that are not explained by the theory: 
 Propagation  of  ideology from  institution to institution and 
  Aggressive lobbying through act of threatening.  
 
85 
 
As mentioned in the Introduction that the prior lobbying literature by accounting 
profession is focused on and provides examples of lobbying the accounting 
standard setting process on international and national levels. However, the area of 
audit policy making in regional level is less explored. Drawing from the prior 
literature to understand the lobbying done by the profession on international and 
national accounting standard-setting, this thesis establishes how the lobbying of the 
accounting profession on regional (EU) setting is unique from that of international 
and national levels. The case of lobbying the policy making process of EU is 
particularly interesting because of its unique institutional setting, which is referred 
to as "decision-making triangle". As discussed in earlier chapters of this thesis the 
triangle comprise of three institutions: the EC, the EP and the Council. The 
relevance of this setting to the case of lobbying is that it provides multiple access 
points to reach out to EU regulators, in order to influence the legislative procedure 
of EU. However, known from the previous studies on international and national 
level, the focus of lobbying effort of the profession is concentrated solely on these 
private standard setting bodies. Therefore, as a result of multiple access point to the 
EU institutions, it raises the chances and opportunities for the lobbyists to influence 
the policy-making process, whereas, for the private standard-setting bodies such 
opportunities might be limited. 
Another contrasting aspect of EU setting with international and national standard 
setting bodies is that in EU institutions especially EC and EP members rely on the 
professional experts of the relevant field for technical knowledge, to formulate the 
regulation. In the case of EU audit reform this aspect was confirmed in the 
interviews with FEE and Mr. Cooper, in addition, it is also known from that EU 
Commissioners reach out members of the profession and interested groups for 
expert knowledge and information for the commission's legislative work (EP, 
2003). The reliance of the regulators on the recipients of the regulation makes it 
easy for the profession and the interested groups to push their bias suggestions and 
promote their interest, to influence the regulation in their favor. However, in the 
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examples of IASB and FASB, being the professional standard-setter, they have 
enough technical and expert knowledge; therefore, they are not dependent on the 
accounting profession or any interested parties for such information. Thus, the 
opportunities for lobbyists of interested parties to influence the standard-setting 
process of these bodies are limited, compared to EU policy making. 
It has also been identified as a gap in the introduction, that the prior research on 
lobbying by accounting profession using the theory of profession is limited. It has 
been found that the literature on lobbying by accounting profession has been broad, 
in terms that different researcher have used variety of different theories, for 
instance, the economic theory of regulation and the agency theory. These studies 
identify only a few motives behind the lobbying of accounting profession, for 
instance, accounting firms' and their clients interest, security from the risk litigation 
cost and regulatory scrutiny, financial benefits and accounting profession's private 
interest. However, by using the Theory of Profession in the particular case of 
lobbying by accounting profession on the new EU audit reform helped the authors 
in developing in-depth understanding of and identifying a range of elaborated 
underlying motives of the profession to influence the reform. Using the Theory of 
Profession to answer the research question of this thesis, it was found that 
accounting profession had variety of underlying motives behind the arguments they 
presented in the formal documents. For instance, accounting firms' struggle to 
maintain and control its jurisdiction; control the definition of its jurisdiction; 
control the market for its expertise; protect its oligopolistic status; maintain self-
regulation and commercial self-interest. 
 The studies of lobbying mentioned in the literature review, identify some methods 
of lobbying employed by the accounting profession, especially the accounting 
firms, to influence the standard-setters. These methods include submission of 
comment letters and meetings with regulators. The authors found that some of the 
methods identified by prior researchers were used by the profession to lobby the 
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reform, for instance, mobilizing other agencies such as, MEPs and national 
representatives (Sweden) in EU and submission of comment letter. However, the 
theory of profession explains some of the specific methods of lobbying used by the 
accounting profession as well. For instance, exercise of collective power by 
creation of elite groups by accounting firms, stakeholder engagement, and power to 
influence through knowledge monopolies.  
The contribution of authors to the Theory of Profession is the methods of influence 
identified through the course of this research that have not been addressed or 
explained in the theory. These methods are propagation of ideology between 
institutions and the act of aggressive lobbying though threatening the regulators.   
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7 Conclusion 
This thesis analyses the method employed and the motives behind the lobbying of 
accounting profession directed to the EU institutions, to influence the policy-
making process of the new EU audit reform. The lobbying might have been on 
various different matters of the Directive and the Regulation, however, the focus of 
this thesis has been on the three controversial articles of Regulation 537/2014. 
These articles include MFR, Prohibition of NAS and Capping of fees of NAS. The 
thesis adopted a qualitative research strategy to provide an in-depth analysis of the 
method and motive of the lobbying against the three measures, in addition, content 
analysis method was used to analyze the content as well as the context of the data 
collected. The content analysis method contributed towards identification and 
analysis of the underlying motives of lobbying behind the arguments presented by 
the profession in the data collected. 
Moreover, the thesis used the theory of profession under the Neo-Weberian 
approach, which helped in studying the characteristics and attributes of the 
accounting profession, to establish what could be their motives behind the lobbying 
of the reform and how did the profession organize itself to strengthen its influence. 
Using the Theory of Profession, a range of motives of the accounting profession 
was found, to influence the new EU audit reform. These included accounting firms' 
struggle to promote their self-interest; protecting and maintaining its jurisdiction; 
control the definition of its jurisdiction; protecting its oligopolistic status; sustain its 
fee level; control the market for its expertise; maintaining self-regulation and the 
commercial interest of the accounting firms. In addition, the theory also helped in 
the understanding of and supported majority of the methods of lobbying used by 
the accounting profession to influence the reform. These method include: exercise 
of individual and collective power by submitting comment letters; formation of 
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professional associations to exercise collective power; stakeholder engagement; 
mobilizing agencies like MEPs and national (Swedish) representatives in EU and 
use of knowledge monopoly to influence the regulators.  
The lobbying of the accounting profession to influence the audit reform was not 
restricted to any one access point; rather the profession directed its efforts all the 
three EU institutions. For the EC and EP evidences of intense lobbying were found, 
whereas, due to lack of transparency enough evidence of lobbying was not found in 
the European Council. However, even after such aggressive lobbying to promote its 
interest, the accounting profession is not found satisfied by the final legislation. 
This thesis has three contributions, firstly, to the literature on lobbying by 
establishing how the accounting profession lobbied unique regional (EU) setting 
and it's different governmental institutions. Secondly, the contribution of this thesis 
to literature on lobbying by the profession is by using the theory of profession to 
develop deeper understanding of the motive and methods of the lobbying by 
accounting profession.  Finally, this thesis contributes to the Theory of Profession 
by identifying some of the method of influence used by the professions that are not 
explained in the theory. These methods include propagation of ideology from 
institution to institution, and aggressive lobbying by threatening the regulators.  
This thesis has a region specific orientation, however it also includes examples of 
lobbying by the accounting profession on international and nation (Sweden) levels. 
Therefore, it can be an inspiration for studying country specific cases of lobbying 
by the accounting profession.  Secondly, the scope of this thesis has been limited to 
three measures of the Regulation; however, other measures have not been taken 
into consideration, for instance, adoption of ISA for which there is a scope for 
future research.  Thirdly, this study only focus on one stakeholder of the reform, i.e. 
the accounting profession, however, multi-stakeholder perspective could be an 
interesting area of research. Finally, determining the success of the profession in 
lobbying the reform is not the scope of this thesis; however, this type of research 
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could be a valuable contribution to the lobbying by the profession on the EU audit 
reform.  
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Appendix B  
 List of text and verbal data issued by the accounting professional between 2010 and 2014 
Member of 
profession 
Document Date of 
publishing 
 
IFAC 
IFAC: response to the Green Paper December 2010 
IFAC respond on PCAOB Concept Release on Auditor Independence 
and Audit Firm Rotation Release No. 2011-006; August 16, 2011 
December 2011 
European Audit Legislation Creates Potential for Regulatory Divergence April 2014 
 
FEE 
FEE Letter: Full response to the Green Paper December 2010 
FEE Briefing Paper: Appointment of the Auditor June 2011 
FEE News Release: initial views on European Commission Proposals on 
Audit Policy 
November 2011 
FEE Article in the Parliament Magazine: Taking audit policy forward December 2011 
FEE President Speech in a public hearing of the European Parliament: 
How to best improve the quality of audit? 
March 2012 
FEE Policy Statement: The Provision of Non-Audit Services to Audit 
Clients that are Public Interest Entities (PIEs) 
June 2012 
FEE News Release: Council split on European Commission's proposals 
on audit policy 
May 2013 
FEE Article: Audit Policy under the Lithuanian Presidency August 2013 
FEE Letter to the European Commission regarding the new Audit 
Reform (Directive and Regulation) 
February 2014 
 
FAR 
Response to European Commission's Green Paper on Audit Policy: 
Lessons from the Crisis 
December 2010 
FAR debate article published in Dagens Industri: ” Nu går EU om USA i 
krångel” 
December 2011 
EU audit reform (Ju2011/8676/L1) Jaunary 2012 
 Dan Brännström’s interview, Regelrådets news release Regelrätt 
(number 5) 
February 2012 
Firms are indicating thumbs down regarding EU audit reform  August 2012 
FAR publication on the website: ”Proposal to amendments in EU audit 
reform” 
September 2012 
FAR’s Position Paper November 2012 
 Response to European Commission Green Paper on ‘Audit Policy: 
Lessons from the Crisis’ 
December 2010 
105 
 
Deloitte Deloitte Audit Reform Briefing: 
Unprecedented reform proposed for the EU audit market 
2012 
Governance in brief: European Parliament approves EU audit legislation April 2014 
E&Y 
 
 
Green Paper entitled “Audit Policy: Lessons from the Crisis” - 
COM(2010) 561 final 
December 2010 
European Commission legislative proposals on audit policy December 2011 
Q&A on mandatory firm rotation March 2013 
Public policy developments affecting the 
accounting profession and our business 
July 2013 
June 2013 
 
EY News and views January 2014 
European Union audit legislation April 2014 
KPMG 
 
European Commission Green Paper - Audit Policy: Lessons from the 
Crisis 
December 2010 
EU audit reforms – the KPMG view April 2014 
 
PWC 
 
PwC response to Green Paper on Audit Policy December 2010 
News Release: European Businesses Cautious on Radical Audit Reform July 2011 
News release: European Commission Misses Opportunity On Audit 
Reform  
November 2011 
Point of view: Benefits of scale: The context and the explanation 2012 2012 
 Point of View: Mandatory audit firm rotation – other changes would be 
better for investors  
March 2013 
PwC Regulatory Briefing March 2013 
News release: PwC Response to the European Parliament's Legal Affairs 
Committee (JURI) vote on audit proposals 
April 2013 
Point of View: Auditors’ scope of services June 2013 
Press statement - PwC response to "trilogue" agreement on a proposed 
regulation on the statutory audit of public interest entities in the 
European Union 
December 2013 
News release: PwC Response to European Parliament Vote on European 
Union audit reforms 
April 2014 
BDO Green Paper: Audit Policy: Lessons from the Crisis December 2010 
BDO comment on the vote of the European Parliament Legal Affairs 
Committee on the EC audit reform  
April 2014 
Grant Thornton  European Commission Green Paper - Audit Policy: Lessons from the 
Crisis 
December 2010 
EGIAN 
 
Audit Policy: Lessons from the Crisis December 2010 
An EGIAN position paper June 2011 
Position Paper May 2012 
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Appendix C 
  Interview guidance 
(Professional bodies) 
Ethical questions 
1. Do you allow us to record the interview 
2. Can we disclose your name in our list of interviewees? 
3. Can we quote you? 
4.  Would you like to see or approve the information quoted from the interview in the 
thesis, before its submission? 
Interview Questions 
1. Can you please tell us about your involvement in communication between XX and the 
EU regarding the audit reform? 
2. What is XX’s general opinion about the new EU audit reform regarding Mandatory 
audit firm rotation, Prohibition of non audit services and Capping of fee on non audit 
services (the three matters)? 
3. On which grounds or reasons did XX form its opinion? 
4. During our study of the formal opinion of the accounting profession regarding the 
reform we have found that XX’s and large audit firm’s opinions were similar. Can you 
explain this? 
5. Being a part of the accounting profession, what were XX's activities with regards to 
the policy making of the audit reform, with exception to submitting Green Paper? 
6. What kind of stakeholder engagement did you witness, during the policy making 
phase of the reform? 
7. It is known that to strengthen their viewpoints, interest groups usually unite. Was this 
a case to some extent? 
8.  How did XX try to convince the EU of its views and reasoning behind these specific 
articles (Mandatory audit firm rotation, Prohibition of non audit services and Capping 
of fee on non audit services)? 
9. What was the response of the EP and EC regarding XX’s opinion on these three 
articles? 
10. Is XX convinced with the final version of the Regulation?    
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Appendix D 
Interview guidance 
(MEPs) 
Ethical questions 
1. Do you allow us to record the interview 
2. Can we disclose your name in our list of interviewees? 
3. Can we quote you? 
4.  Would you like to see or approve the information quoted from the interview in the 
thesis, before its submission? 
Interview Questions 
 
1. Can you please tell us about your involvement in communication between XX and the 
EU regarding the audit reform? 
2. What is your general opinion about the new EU audit reform regarding Mandatory 
audit firm rotation, Prohibition of non audit services and Capping of fee on non audit 
services (the three matters)?  
3. While reading professional journals regarding the new EU audit reform, we figured 
out that much has been said about lobbying on the reform. Can you please tell which 
stakeholders were particularly involved in the act? 
4. In an article in Accountancy Age, we found that discussions are raging on the matter 
of lobbying and political pressure on MEPs, especially the Spanish MEP Antonio 
Hidalgo, who wrote to the then EP president Jerzy Buzek, claiming he had been 
threatened by a lobbyist belonging to a Spanish audit firm. Can you please tell us in 
detail what kind of lobbying act did you witness? 
5. What in your opinion were the motives behind the lobbying of the audit firms, 
especially with regards to the three matters?   
6. Did the audit firms lobby individually or were organized in groups (e.g. audit firms 
lobbied together with professional organizations? 
7. Can you tell us about any meetings or interactions conducted between auditors, 
professional organizations and  MEPs, that could help the accounting profession to 
promote their views? 
8. Did the accounting profession use any other method to influence the reform according 
to their interest, particularly with regards to the three matters? 
9. To what extent did the EU take into consideration the interest and viewpoints of the 
accounting profession, on the three matters, in the final legislation? 
